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Abstract
This paper presents a systematic approach for analyzing the departure-time choice equilibrium
(DTCE) problem of a single bottleneck with heterogeneous commuters. The approach is based
on the fact that the DTCE is equivalently represented as a linear programming problem with a
special structure, which can be analytically solved by exploiting the theory of optimal transport
combined with a decomposition technique. By applying the proposed approach to several types
of models with heterogeneous commuters, it is shown that (i) the essential condition for emerging
equilibrium “sorting patterns,” which have been known in the literature, is that the schedule delay
functions have the “Monge property,” (ii) the equilibrium problems with the Monge property can
be solved analytically, and (iii) the proposed approach can be applied to a more general problem
with more than two types of heterogeneities.
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1. Introduction
The modeling and analysis of rush-hour traffic congestion has a rich history, dating back to
the seminal work of Vickrey (1969). In the basic model proposed by Vickrey, it is assumed that a
fixed number of commuters with homogeneous preferences wish to arrive at a single destination
(workplace) at the same preferred time, traveling through a single route that has a bottleneck
of a fixed capacity. Each commuter chooses the departure time of his/her trip from home to
minimize his/her generalized trip cost, including trip time, queuing delay at the bottleneck and
schedule delay (i.e., costs of arriving early or late at their destination). The problem is to deter-
mine a dynamic equilibrium distribution of departure times for which no commuter can reduce
his/her generalized cost by changing his/her departure time unilaterally. The importance of this
IAn earlier version of this paper has been circulated under the title “Departure time choice equilibrium and optimal
transport problems.”
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problem in transportation planning and demand management policies has led to various exten-
sions of the basic model to allow for (1) distributed/heterogeneous preferred departure times,
(2) heterogeneity in the valuation of travel time and schedule delay, (3) elastic demands and (4)
modal/route/parking choices. For a recent comprehensive review, refer to Li et al. (2020).
Despite these extensive studies, however, the extant analysis approaches have several lim-
itations, and are not necessarily organized into a sufficiently general theory that enables us to
systematically understand various extant results. First, most previous studies focused only on
a single type of user heterogeneity either in the preferred arrival time at the destination (e.g.,
Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981; Smith, 1984; Daganzo, 1985) or in the valuation of travel time
and schedule delay (e.g., Cohen, 1987; Arnott et al., 1988, 1992, 1994; Ramadurai et al., 2010;
van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011; Liu et al., 2015; Takayama and Kuwahara, 2017)1. As a re-
sult, little is known about certain regularities of the equilibrium when there are multiple types
of heterogeneity in the preferences of users. Second, most studies restricted their analysis to a
special class of schedule functions (e.g., a piecewise linear function)2. This is theoretically prob-
lematic because it blurs the critical conditions required for the analysis results. For instance, two
models of Daganzo (1985) and Arnott et al. (1994) have different types of users’ heterogeneities
(i.e., work start times and value of times (VOTs)/penalties); however, a similar sorting property
emerges: users arrive at the bottleneck in the order of their work start times (i.e., the “first-in-
first-work (FIFW) principle”) in the former model; users’ arrivals are sorted in the order of their
VOTs in the latter model. This evokes a several questions, such as what conditions are essential
for the emergence of “sorting patterns” in the equilibrium and what conditions are required for
obtaining an analytical solution?. However, answers to such basic questions are not known. Fi-
nally, for the models with a general schedule delay function and user heterogeneity, systematic
and efficient methods for obtaining accurate solutions are still lacking. As shown by Nie and
Zhang (2009), the straight-forward formulation of the model (equilibrium conditions) results in
a variational inequality (VI) problem with a non-monotone mapping, which implies that a naı¨ve
numerical algorithm does not guarantee convergence.
This paper proposes a systematic and unified approach to analyze a wide variety of models
of departure-time choice equilibrium (DTCE) with a single bottleneck. The proposed approach
is based on the following two facts: (1) the equilibrium can be obtained by solving a structured
linear programming (LP) problem and (2) the special structure of the equivalent LP problem
allows us to apply the theory of optimal transport (Rachev and Ru¨schendorf, 1998; Burkard,
2007; Villani, 2008), which provides explicit analytical solutions as well as efficient numerical
algorithms. To attain the purpose in a clear manner, we mainly consider the DTCE models whose
properties (under restricted assumptions) are familiar in the literature.
More specifically, we first review the relationships between the arrival-time-based formula-
tion of the DTCE models and the departure-time-based one. It has been shown that the departure-
time-based formulation has a big advantage, that is, the (part of) equilibrium conditions reduce
to an equivalent LP problem; the LP problem can be effectively utilized to study pricing and
system optimal problems and can be solved easily by an established convergent algorithm (or an
LP solver). We then reveal that the equivalent LP problems for various types of DTCE problems
have structural commonalities, to which the theory of optimal transport can be applied either
1A few exceptions are Newell (1987); and Lindsey (2004); however, the former assumes a special class of schedule
functions and the latter focuses only on proving the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
2Smith (1984) and Daganzo (1985) are exceptions; however, they assume that all commuters have the same schedule
delay function.
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directly or indirectly. Through several examples, we demonstrate how the optimal transport the-
ory can be applied to the DTCE problems. The above-mentioned sorting patterns for different
models can be explained by a property of the schedule delay function in a unified manner; even
analytical solutions are obtained for certain cases. We also show that the proposed approach
enables us to systematically analyze the basic properties of the equilibrium, such as existence,
uniqueness, and regularities of the flow patterns (e.g., temporal “sorting” patterns).
As a first example of the approach, we demonstrate that the DTCE problem with hetero-
geneous preferred departure times is analytically solvable and that the sorting property of the
equilibrium flow pattern (i.e., the FIFW principle) can be understood from the optimal transport
theory as a direct consequence of “submodularity” or the “Monge property” of the schedule delay
cost function. As a second example, we consider the DTCE problem with heterogeneous sched-
ule cost functions (i.e., users are differentiated according to their VOT). For this type of DTCE
problem, the straightforward application of the optimal transport theory is not possible because
the schedule cost functions do not satisfy the Monge property. Nevertheless, by developing an
approach in which the optimal transport theory is applied to the subproblems generated from a
hierarchical decomposition of the original LP problem, we can show that the DTCE problem is
analytically solvable under mild assumptions regarding the schedule cost function. Finally, this
approach is further extended to generalized DTCE models with two types of cost heterogeneity.
In the remainder of this article, after briefly describing the problem setting (Section 2), Sec-
tion 3 reviews the arrival-time-based formulation of the DTCE models. With some new variables,
Section 4 converts the arrival-time-based formulation to the departure-time-based one. We then
introduce an LP approach to the DTCE problem with heterogeneous commuters and show its
some advantages and applications. Section 5 briefly reviews the theory of optimal transport and
presents an illustrative example of how it can be applied to analyze the DTCE problem with
heterogeneous preferred departure times. Section 6 analyzes the DTCE problems with hetero-
geneous schedule delay cost functions, in which we provide a new analytical approach of com-
bining a hierarchical decomposition with the optimal transport theory. Section 7 further extends
the approach to generalized DTCE models with two types of cost heterogeneity. Concluding
remarks are presented in Section 8.
2. Morning commute equilibrium problems
We consider a road network with a single O-D pair connected by one route. We assume that
one user travels in every vehicle. Users are treated as a continuum, and the total mass is denoted
by Q, which is a given constant. The route has a single bottleneck with a capacity (maximum
service rate) of µ. The queuing congestion at the bottleneck is described by a point queue model,
in which the queue is assumed to form vertically at the entrance of the bottleneck. Users are
classified into a finite number, K, of homogeneous groups. The index set of groups is denoted by
K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Let the mass of users in group k ∈ K be Qk; then, ∑k∈K Qk = Q.
Users choose their departure time from the origin (or the bottleneck) so as to minimize their
trip cost. The trip cost is assumed to be additively separable into free-flow travel, queuing delay,
and schedule delay costs. The free-flow travel time from the origin to the bottleneck is assumed,
without loss of generality, to be zero unless otherwise noted. We also assume that the departure
time from the bottleneck is the arrival time at the destination. The schedule delay, , is defined as
the difference between the actual and preferred departure times from the bottleneck; the schedule
delay cost function ck() measured in the (queuing) time unit is assumed to be a continuous and
piecewise differentiable function of the schedule delay and is specified in the later sections.
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Under these assumptions, the morning commute equilibrium is defined as the state in which
no user could reduce his/her trip cost by changing his/her departure/arrival time unilaterally.
There are two types of formulations for the equilibrium: arrival-time-based and departure-time-
based. In the former formulation, all variables are expressed as functions of the arrival time
at the bottleneck; in the latter formulation, they are functions of the departure time from the
bottleneck. While the two formulations are essentially equivalent, their mathematical structures
are quite different for some instances. In the next section, we will show the former formulation;
we will then convert it to the latter one, which is the basis of our new approach, in Section 4.
3. Arrival-time-based formulation
3.1. Formulation
Let t ∈ T be the arrival time at the bottleneck andT ⊂ R be a sufficiently long morning rush
hour during which all users complete their trips. The queuing delay of users with arrival time t at
the bottleneck is denoted by d(t). The schedule delay  of users in group k whose the preferred
departure time σk is expressed as t + d(t) − σk. Because σk is constant for users, their schedule
delay cost function is a function of the departure time, t + d(t); that is, ck() = ck(t + d(t)).
At equilibrium, the following four conditions should hold. The first condition is the uses’
optimal choice condition:vk = d(t) + ck(t + d(t)) if λk(t) > 0vk ≤ d(t) + ck(t + d(t)) if λk(t) = 0 ∀k ∈ K , ∀t ∈ T , (3.1)
where vk represents the minimum (equilibrium) trip cost for users in group k and λk(t) denotes
group k’s arrival flow rate at the bottleneck at time t.
The second condition is the queuing delay condition. In the point queue model (for the
details, see Appendix A), the queuing delay d(t) for a user arriving at the bottleneck at time t
can be represented by
d˙(t) =
λ(t)/µ − 1 if d(t) > 0max .[0, λ(t)/µ − 1] if d(t) = 0 ∀t ∈ T , (3.2a)
where the “dot” denotes the derivative operation with respect to arrival time t, and λ(t) ≡∑
k∈K λk(t). This implies that the queuing delay should satisfyd˙(t) = λ(t)/µ − 1 if d(t) > 0d˙(t) ≥ λ(t)/µ − 1 if d(t) = 0 ∀t ∈ T . (3.2b)
In this study, we employ the complementarity condition (3.2b), instead of (3.2a), as the queuing
delay model. This is because it is analytically tractable and its essential features are consistent
with the original point queue model (e.g., the first-in-first-out (FIFO) property holds)3.
3See Ban et al. (2012), Han et al. (2013) and Jin (2015) for more detailed discussions.
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Figure 1: Correspondence between two equilibrium formulations
The third condition is the flow conservation condition. For each user group k, the integral of
the arrival flow rate λk(t) at the bottleneck must be equal to the total mass Qk; that is,∫
T
λk(t)dt = Qk ∀k ∈ K . (3.3)
The last condition determines the departure flow rate, κ(t), from the bottleneck. This con-
dition seems trivial, but it is necessary to complete the equilibrium flow pattern. Following the
FIFO principle, we have the following flow propagation condition:
D(t + d(t)) = A(t) ∀t ∈ T (3.4a)
κ(t + d(t)) = λ(t)/(1 + d˙(t)) ∀t ∈ T , (3.4b)
where A(t) [D(t)] denotes the cumulative arrival [departure] flow at the bottleneck by time t,
λ(t) = dA(t)/dt, and κ(t) = dD(t)/dt. Note that the resulting κ(t) is always nonnegative and
satisfies the capacity constraint (i.e., κ(t) ≤ µ).
Because there are only three types of the unknown variables (λ,d,v), the first three condi-
tions are sufficient to determine them. Therefore, we can solve the equilibrium problem in two
sequential steps (see Figure 1). The first step (Submodel A1) solves the equilibrium conditions
(3.1), (3.2b), and (3.3) simultaneously. The second step (Submodel A2) constructs the equilib-
rium departure pattern by combining the condition (3.4) with the solution from the first step.
Alternatively, we can obtain κ(t), or equivalently D(t), from the point queue model for a given
A(t) in a more constructive manner.
3.2. Equivalent complementarity and variational inequality problems of Submodel A1
Submodel A1, (3.1), (3.2b) and (3.3), can be expressed as the following continuous-time (or
infinite-dimensional) nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP): Find (λ,d,v) such that
0 ≤ λk(t) ⊥ d(t) + ck(t + d(t)) − vk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K , ∀t ∈ T , (3.5a)
0 ≤ d(t) ⊥ d˙(t) − [λ(t)/µ − 1] ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T , (3.5b)
0 ≤ vk ⊥
∫
T λk(t)dt −Qk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K . (3.5c)
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It can be seen that, if the schedule delay cost function ck(t + d(t)) is linear in the schedule
delay (and thus linear in the queuing delay d(t)), the NCP reduces to the linear complementarity
problem (LCP). For example, with a piecewise linear schedule delay cost function, the discrete-
time problem is formulated as a finite-dimensional LCP (Ramadurai et al., 2010); its continuous-
time counterpart was studied as a linear complimentarily system (Pang et al., 2012). However,
there is no study on the NCP (3.5), and its properties are largely unknown.
Submodel A1 can also be studied as a continuous-time variational inequality (VI) problem
as follows. Find λ∗ ∈ Ωλ such that∑
k∈K
∫
T
Ck(λ)
(
λk(t) − λ∗k(t)
)
dt ≥ 0 ∀λ ∈ Ωλ, (3.6)
where Ck(λ) is the trip cost of users in group k, which is an implicit function of the arrival flow
rate λ and is evaluated by the schedule delay cost function and queuing delay condition, and
Ωλ = {λk(t) |
∫
T λk(t)dt = Qk, λk(t) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K , ∀t ∈ T }. However, because the mapping
Ck(λ) of this VI problem may not be monotone even for the simplest case with K = 1 (i.e.,
homogeneous user case) and a piecewise linear schedule delay cost function (Nie and Zhang,
2009), it is generally difficult to establish a convergent solution method for it.
The above observations indicate that the arrival-time-based formulation of the morning com-
mute problem may not be a tractable way to analyze the equilibrium for a general setting. In
contrast, the departure-time-based formulation shown in the next section possesses a much sim-
pler mathematical expression of the (part of) equilibrium conditions, that is, it reduces to an
equivalent LP problem.
4. Departure-time-base formulation with linear programming
4.1. Formulation
Let s ∈ S be the departure time from the bottleneck and S ⊂ R be a sufficiently long
morning rush hour during which all users complete their trips. The queuing delay of users with
departure time s from the bottleneck is denoted by b(s). As in the previous section, because the
schedule delay  is s − σk, the schedule delay cost function is expressed as a function of the
departure time, s; that is, ck() = ck(s). However, unlike the arrival-time-based formulation, ck(s)
is evaluated independent of the state variables and thus can be treated as a given parameter (or a
given function). We will convert the arrival-time-based formulation (3.1), (3.2b), (3.3), and (3.4)
to the departure-time based formulation.
As a preliminary step in the conversion, we summarize the relationships between the vari-
ables in the arrival-time-based and departure-time-based formulations. First, the relationship
between the arrival and departure times is given by t = τ(s) ≡ s− b(s). Then, the FIFO condition
can be written as, D(s) = A(τ(s)). By taking a derivative of both sides of this condition with
respect to s, we have
x(s) = λ(τ(s)) · ∆τ(s),
where x(s) ≡ ∆D(s) denotes the departure flow rate from the bottleneck at time s and ∆ denotes
the derivative operation with respect to bottleneck-departure-time s; that is,
∆τ(s) ≡ dτ(s)/ds = 1 − ∆b(s).
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Figure 2: Relationships between arrival and departure times/flows
These relationships can be graphically understood from Figure 2. Regarding the cost variables,
for users departing from the bottleneck at time s, the queuing delay b(s) is obviously given by
b(s) = d(τ(s)), which implies that
∆b(s) = d˙(τ(s)) · ∆τ(s).
Now, let us derive the departure-time-based formulation by substituting the above relation-
ships into the arrival-time-based formulation. First, the users’ optimal choice condition (3.1)
reduces tovk = b(s) + ck(s) if xk(s)/∆τ(s) > 0vk ≤ b(s) + ck(s) if xk(s)/∆τ(s) = 0 ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ S. (4.1a)
At equilibrium, the following condition (i.e., a relaxed version of the condition (4.1a)) must also
be met because the departure flow rate xk(s) is nonnegative.vk = b(s) + ck(s) if xk(s) > 0vk ≤ b(s) + ck(s) if xk(s) = 0 ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ S. (4.1b)
With the assumption ∆τ(s) > 0, both conditions are consistent. Otherwise, the condition (4.1a)
[(4.1b)] can produce negative departure [arrival] flow rates. This means that ∆τ(s) > 0 must be
met if the equilibrium exists. We will later discuss the condition under which the assumption
holds, but we accept it for the moment and use the condition (4.1b) as the users’ optimal choice
condition.
Second, the queuing delay condition (3.2b) can be represented as∆b(s) = x(s)/µ − ∆τ(s) if b(s) > 0∆b(s) ≥ x(s)/µ − ∆τ(s) if b(s) = 0 ∀s ∈ S. (4.2a)
Because ∆τ(s) + ∆b(s) = 1 by definition, the condition reduces to
∑
k∈K xk(s) = µ if b(s) > 0∑
k∈K xk(s) ≤ µ if b(s) = 0
∀s ∈ S. (4.2b)
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solution of  
Submodel D1
Figure 3: Schematic illustration of the construction of the cumulative arrival curve from the solution of Subproblem D1
Third, it is easily seen that the flow conservation condition (3.3) reduces to∫
S
xk(s)ds = Qk ∀k ∈ K . (4.3)
Finally, we must determine the arrival flow rate λ(τ(s)) at the bottleneck. As shown above,
the FIFO discipline implies that
A(s − b(s)) = D(s) ∀s ∈ S (4.4a)
λ(s − b(s)) = x(s)/(1 − ∆b(s)) ∀s ∈ S. (4.4b)
As noted, to ensure the nonnegativity and finiteness of the arrival flow rate, the above assumption,
∆τ(s) = 1 − ∆b(s) > 0, must be met.
Similar to the arrival-time-based formulation, the problem can be solved in two sequential
steps (see again Figure 1). The first step (Submodel D1) solves the first three conditions (4.1b),
(4.2b), and (4.3), simultaneously to determine the three types of unknown variables (x,b,v). The
second step (Submodel D2) completes the equilibrium arrival pattern by combining the condition
(4.4) with the solution in the first step. Note that a more constructive way to obtain the arrival
flow pattern is to use the inverse functions of cumulative curves A(·) and D(·). As shown in
Figure 3, the FIFO condition of the point queue model is represented as follows:
A−1(n) = D−1(n) − b(D−1(n)) ∀n, (4.5)
where A−1(n) and D−1(n) denote the nth user’s arrival and departure times at/from the bottleneck,
respectively. Because we know both terms on the right-hand side of Eq.(4.5) (i.e., the solution in
the first step), we can construct the equilibrium cumulative arrival curve A(·), which is perfectly
consistent with the queuing model.
So far, we have shown the correspondence of each of the four equilibrium conditions with
the two formulations by assuming ∆τ(s) > 0. Now, let us show the condition under which the
assumption holds.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose ∆ck(s) > −1. Then, ∆τ(s) > 0 holds true.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
We should note that the condition, ∆ck(s) > −1, is consistent with the existence conditions
of the equilibrium shown in Smith (1984) and Lindsey (2004). Then, we obtain the following
proposition on the equivalence of the two formulations.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose there exists a morning commute equilibrium, or equivalently ∆ck(s) >
−1. Then, the departure-time-based equilibrium conditions (4.1b), (4.2b), (4.3), (4.4) and the
arrival-time-based conditions (3.1), (3.2b), (3.3), (3.4) are equivalent in the sense that the solu-
tion of one formulation satisfies all conditions of the other formulation.
4.2. Equivalent linear programming of Submodel D1
In the following sections, we propose a systematic approach to analyze a wide variety of
models of a morning commute equilibrium. The basis of this approach is the fact that Submodel
D1, (4.1b), (4.2b), and (4.3), reduces to an equivalent LP problem. The equivalent LP problem
was first shown by Iryo et al. (2005) and Iryo and Yoshii (2007) in a discrete-time setting. We
briefly describe the LP problem below, but for a continuous-time setting.
Consider first the following infinite-dimensional LP problem:
[2D-LP(x)] min
x≥0 . Z(x) ≡
∑
k∈K
∫
S
ck(s)xk(s)ds (4.6)
subject to
∑
k∈K
xk(s) ≤ µ ∀s ∈ S (4.7)∫
S
xk(s)ds = Qk ∀k ∈ K , (4.8)
and the associated dual problem:
[2D-LP(u,v)] max
u≥0,v . Zˇ(u,v) ≡ −µ
∫
S
u(s)ds +
∑
k∈K
Qkvk (4.9)
subject to ck(s) + u(s) − vk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ S, (4.10)
where u(s) and vk are Lagrange multipliers for (4.7) and (4.8), respectively. As noted, ck(s) is
a parameter (or a coefficient) and is given exogenously. As shown in Appendix C, the strong
duality for [2D-LP(x)] holds, implying the following complementarity slackness (or optimality)
conditions:xk(s){ck(s) + u(s) − vk} = 0ck(s) + u(s) − vk ≥ 0, xk(s) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ S (4.11)u(s){µ −
∑
k∈Kxk(s)} = 0
µ −∑k∈Kxk(s) ≥ 0, u(s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S. (4.12)
Comparing the optimality conditions above and the equilibrium conditions (4.1b), (4.2b), and
(4.3), we can easily see that these are equivalent if we can interpret the Lagrange multiplier u of
the optimality conditions as the queuing delay b. For this interpretation to be valid, the arrival
9
flow rate at the bottleneck should be physically feasible (i.e., non-negative and finite). From
the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 4.1, it is easily seen that the interpretation is valid if
the schedule cost function satisfies ∆ck(s) > −14. The above discussion is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. (Iryo et al., 2005; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007; Akamatsu et al., 2015) Suppose there
exists a morning commute equilibrium, or equivalently ∆ck(s) > −1. Then, the optimal solution
(x,u,v) of [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u,v)] is consistent with the equilibrium conditions.
It is now clear that the departure-time-based formulation has an advantage over the arrival-
based formulation. Submodel D1 with a general schedule delay function reduces to [2D-LP(x)],
which can be solved and analyzed much easier than the equivalent NCP or VI of Submodel
A1. In Sections 5 and 6, we will study specific morning commute equilibrium problems by
appropriately setting ck(s) of the equivalent LP problem [2D-LP(x)] for each problem. However,
it should be emphasized here that [2D-LP(x)] has a powerful ability to deal with a wide variety
of models (other than the models in Sections 5 and 6) without imposing restrictive assumptions
on schedule delay functions (or user heterogeneities).
4.3. Equilibrium versus system optimal
The equivalent LP problem is more powerful than it appears; it can also be applied to some
control problems. One important class of such examples is the equilibrium problem under tolls
(e.g., Arnott et al., 1990; Laih, 1994; Lindsey et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2015). Let p(s) be the
exogenously given toll for departure time s from the bottleneck. Then, the users’ optimal choice
condition at equilibrium is given byxk(s){ck(s) + α−1k p(s) + b(s) − vk} = 0ck(s) + α−1k p(s) + b(s) − vk ≥ 0, xk(s) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ S, (4.13)
where αk denotes the VOT for users in group k. It is easy to see that the (departure-time-based)
equilibrium formulation in which Eq.(4.1b) is replaced with Eq.(4.13) has the following equiva-
lent LP formulation:
min
x≥0 . ZToll(x) ≡
∑
k∈K
∫
S
{
ck(s) + α−1k p(s)
}
xk(s)ds (4.14)
subject to Eq.(4.7) and Eq.(4.8).
Note that, as in the case of [2D-LP(x)], ∆ck(s) + α−1k ∆p(s) > −1 must be met if we interpret
the Lagrangian multiplier u(s) for the capacity constraint (4.7) as the queuing delay b(s). While
the above-mentioned studies do not use the LP formulation, there is a possibility of obtaining
more insight into the theoretical properties of the problem (e.g., some regularity of traffic flow
patterns) by exploiting the LP approach shown in the following sections.
Instead of the time-based equilibrium formulation above, we can describe the equilibrium
under tolls by using costs measured in monetary unit. Specifically, the users’ optimal choice
condition in the monetary-based formulation can be written asxk(s){αkck(s) + p(s) + αkb(s) − αkvk} = 0αkck(s) + p(s) + αkb(s) − αkvk ≥ 0, xk(s) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ S. (4.15)
4∆ck(s) > −1 asserts ∆τ(s) = 1 − ∆u(s) > 0, where τ(s) = s − u(s), and thus λ(τ(s)) = x(s)/∆τ(s) ≥ 0 is obtained.
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This is equivalent to the condition (4.13) because users’ optimal choice does not depend on the
scaling of costs for each user group5. Note, however, that the monetary-based formulation has
no equivalent optimization problem, as in Eq.(4.14) (see Section 6.4 for a similar discussion).
The LP representation of the morning commute equilibrium problem is also closely related
to a dynamic system optimal (DSO) problem with heterogeneous users. Specifically, the DSO
problem (without queuing) is formulated as:
min
x≥0 . ZSO(x) ≡
∑
k∈K
∫
S
{αkck(s)} xk(s)ds (4.16)
subject to Eq.(4.7) and Eq.(4.8).
The only difference from [2D-LP(x)] is that the objective function is measured in monetary
unit, which results in that the equilibrium and optimal flow patterns being different in general.
However, [2D-LP(x)] can be interpreted as a particular case of the DSO problem: the solutions
of the two problems are identical if the VOTs are all the same among user groups (i.e., αk = α).
The optimality conditions for the DSO problem are given by Eq.(4.8), Eq.(4.12), andxk(s){αkck(s) + u˜(s) − v˜k} = 0αkck(s) + u˜(s) − v˜k ≥ 0, xk(s) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ S, (4.17)
where (u˜, v˜) are the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (4.7) and (4.8), respectively. From
a comparison to Eq.(4.15) (or Eq.(4.13)), it is readily seen that the condition (4.17) is equivalent
to the particular case of the users’ optimal choice condition: u˜(s) = p(s) and b(s) = 0, ∀s (and
v˜k = αkvk, ∀k). This means that u˜(s) can be regarded as the dynamic optimal toll pattern p(s)
that eliminates the queuing delay at equilibrium (Doan et al., 2011). Another interpretation is
the market clearing price pattern under a time-dependent tradable bottleneck permit scheme,
which is designed to resolve the problem of congestion during the morning rush hour at a single
bottleneck (Akamatsu et al., 2006; Akamatsu, 2007; Wada and Akamatsu, 2010; Akamatsu and
Wada, 2017). Specifically, the optimality condition of the DSO problem, which corresponds
to Eq.(4.12), is interpreted as the demand-supply market equilibrium for each time s, where
the demand of time period s permit is equal to the departure flow x(s) =
∑
k∈K xk(s), and the
maximum supply of the permit is given by the bottleneck capacity µ.
5. Monge-Kantorovich problem
In the previous section, we expressed the (part of) morning commute equilibrium problem
as the linear program [2D-LP(x)]. If one only wishes to obtain a numerical solution of the
equilibrium problem, it is enough to solve [2D-LP(x)] using an appropriate LP solver. However,
in order to obtain a deeper insight into the theoretical properties (such as uniqueness, some
regularity of flow patterns) of [2D-LP(x)] (or the equilibrium), the theory of optimal transport
(see, Kantorovich, 1942, 1948; Rachev and Ru¨schendorf, 1998; Burkard, 2007; Villani, 2008) is
useful. In this section, we briefly review the role of Monge properties in optimization in Section
5.1 and present an illustrative example of its application to the departure time choice equilibrium
(DTCE) in Section 5.2.
5 It is thus clear that the equilibrium formulation (or [2D-LP(x)]) in previous sections includes the cases in which
users are differentiated by the combination of VOTs and schedule delay functions.
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5.1. Monge property and analytical solution
The optimal transport problem in a two-dimensional discrete space setting is the following
finite-dimensional LP problem, which is well known as “Hitchcock’s transportation problem” in
the operations research and transportation fields:
[2D-OTP] min
x≥0 . Z2D(x) ≡
∑
i∈I
∑
k∈K
ci,kxi,k (5.1)
subject to
∑
k∈K
xi,k = Si ∀i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , I} (5.2)∑
i∈I
xi,k = Qk ∀k ∈ K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} (5.3)
where vectors S and Q are given constants satisfying
∑
i∈I Si =
∑
k∈K Qk.
Before reviewing some useful theorems on the transportation problem, we introduce the fol-
lowing concepts:
Definition. An I × K real matrix C = [ci,k] is called a Monge matrix if C satisfies the following
property (Monge property)
ci,k + ci+1,k+1 ≤ ci,k+1 + ci+1,k for all 1 ≤ i < I, 1 ≤ k < K (5.4)
In addition, if the inequality in (5.4) strictly holds, C is termed a strict Monge matrix.
Definition. Function c : R2 → R is submodular if, and only if,
c(x, y) + c(x′, y′) ≤ c(x, y′) + c(x′, y) for all x ≤ x′, y ≤ y′ (5.5)
In addition, if the inequality in (5.5) strictly holds for x < x′, y < y′, c is called a strict submod-
ular function.
This implies that an I × K matrix C whose elements are given by ci,k := c(i∆x, k∆y) (1 ≤ i ≤
I, 1 ≤ k ≤ K) is a (strict) Monge matrix if the function c : R2 → R is (strict) submodular6.
Thus, we will also term condition (5.5) the (continuous) Monge property. If the inequalities (5.4)
and (5.5) hold in the opposite direction, then the matrix C and function c are said to be an inverse
Monge matrix and supermodular, respectively.
As is well known, a feasible solution to the transportation problem [2D-OTP] can always be
determined by a greedy algorithm termed the northwest corner rule (Hoffman, 1963).
Northwest corner rule
0. Initialize the indices with i := 1 and k := 1.
1. Set xi,k := min{Si,Qk}.
2. Reduce both the supply Si and demand Qk by xi,k: Si := Si − xi,k and Qk := Qk − xi,k.
If some of Si and Qk become zero, then these indices are increased by one.
3. If there still exists an unsatisfied constraint, go back to Step 2.
6Throughout the paper, we express the variable (or parameter) as a function if it depends on a continuous index (i.e.,
time), while we use the subscript for describing its dependence on a discrete index (i.e., user group).
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The Monge property further provides the following useful result:
Theorem 5.1. (Hoffman, 1963, 1985): If the cost matrix C of [2D-OTP] has the Monge property,
then the northwest corner rule yields an optimal solution for arbitrary supply S and demand Q
vectors.
Remarks. It is worth noting that the cost matrix C is not used at all in the northwest corner rule.
This implies that even if we only know that C is a Monge matrix, we can determine an optimal
solution of [2D-OTP] without knowing the explicit values of the cost coefficients. If the cost
coefficients fulfill the inverse Monge property, an optimal solution can be found by the northeast
corner rule7.
Theorem 5.2. (Dubuc et al., 1999): If the matrix C = [ci,k] in Eq.(5.1) is a strict Monge matrix,
then the optimal solution of [2D-OTP] is unique (i.e., the solution provided by the northwest
corner rule is the only solution of [2D-OTP]).
A continuous analog of Theorem 5.1 for the continuous transportation problem (i.e., all the
indices of the parameters and variables in the problem are continuous) is as follows. Let x ∈ X =
R and y ∈ Y = R be random variables and let F1,F2, and F denote the distribution functions
of x, y, and (x, y), respectively. Given a continuous cost function c : R2 → R, the continuous
optimal transport problem can be formulated as:
[2D-COTP] min
F∈F (F1,F2)
. Z2D(F) ≡
∫
X×Y
c(x, y)dF(x, y) (5.6)
where F (F1,F2) ≡ {F(x,∞) = F1(x), F(∞, y) = F2(y),∀x, y ∈ R} (5.7)
Note that F1(∞) = F2(∞). We can easily see the correspondence between the problems [2D-
COTP] and [2D-OTP] by changing the discrete indices to the continuous ones and by rewriting
the demand and supply constraints in [2D-OTP] in a cumulative form (see also Subsection 5.2
for an example).
Theorem 5.3. (Cambanis et al., 1976; Dubuc et al., 1999) Let F1 and F2 be distribution functions
on R. Furthermore, suppose that supF∈F (F1,F2) Z2D(F) < ∞ and the cost function c : R2 → R
is a submodular. Then an optimal solution F∗ ∈ F (F1,F2) is given by the so-called Fre´chet–
Hoeffding distribution
F∗(x, y) = min{F1(x),F2(y)} ∀(x, y) ∈ R2. (5.8)
Furthermore, if the function c is a strict submodular, the solution is unique (i.e., F∗(x, y) is the
only optimal solution of [2D-COTP]).
We note that the northwest corner rule for the discrete transportation problem can be viewed
as explicit rules for calculating the analytical solution (i.e., Fre´chet–Hoeffding distribution) in
the discrete space setting (Burkard, 2007).
7In the northeast corner rule, the algorithm begins with the indices with i := 1 and k := K (or i := I and k := 1), then
the index is decreased by one if Qk (or Si) becomes zero in Step 2 in the northwest corner rule.
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5.2. Illustrative example: Model with heterogeneous preferred departure time
To illustrate the usefulness of the theory of optimal transport in analyzing the DTCE problem,
we here consider a model with heterogeneous preferred departure times. A well-known sorting
property of the equilibrium flow pattern, the so-called the FIFW principle (Daganzo, 1985), can
be understood from the theory of optimal transport as a direct consequence of the Monge property
of the schedule cost function.
Assumption 5.1. The schedule delay cost function is assumed to be identical for all users and
is given by
ck(s) ≡ f ((σk, s)), (σk, s) ≡ s − σk, (5.9)
where σk is the preferred departure time of users in group k and a function f : R → R is
continuous, strictly convex, and has a minimum at  = 0.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that user groups are arranged (indexed) in the increasing order of their
desired arrival times: σ1 < · · · < σK. The function ck(s) defined by (5.9) satisfies the strict Monge
property.
Proof. See Appendix D.1.
In the above setting, in which the departure time is continuous, but the preferred departure
time is discrete (Newell, 1987; Lindsey, 2004), all groups experience a queuing delay to equili-
brate the trip costs of users within each group. This implies that several disjoint departure time
windows can exist in equilibrium. However, we consider a typical morning rush-hour problem
in which a single joint departure time window (i.e., a single rush period) Sˆ ≡ [s0, s0 + T] ⊂ S of
length T = Q/µ occurs in equilibrium (e.g., Smith, 1984; Daganzo, 1985).
For a given equilibrium rush period Sˆ, the DTCE problem (i.e., [2D-LP(x)]) can be reduced
to an instance of the optimal transport problem, where ck(s) satisfies the strict Monge property.
min
x≥0 . Z(x) ≡
∑
k∈K
∫
s∈Sˆ
ck(s)xk(s)ds (5.10)
subject to
∑
k∈K
xk(s) = µ ∀s ∈ Sˆ (5.11)∫
s∈Sˆ
xk(s)ds = Qk ∀k ∈ K (5.12)
Its cumulative form is expressed as follows:
min
F∈F
∫
[1,K]×Sˆ
c(κ, s)dF(κ, s) (5.13)
where F ≡
{
F(κ,T) =
∑
k′≤κQk′ , F(K, s) = µ · (s − s0), ∀κ ∈ [1,K], ∀s ∈ Sˆ
}
. (5.14)
Note that the parameter ck(s) and variable xk(s) that depend on both discrete and continuous
indices (k, s) are related to c(κ, s) and F(κ, s) that depend on the continuous indices (κ, s) as
follows: F(κ, s) ≡ ∑k′≤κ ∫ ss0 xk′ (s)ds, which is a step function of κ for a given s; without loss
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Figure 4: Illustration of the solution to the problem (5.13)
of generality, c(κ, s) is assumed to be a continuous and strict submodular function that satisfies
c(k, s) = ck(s), ∀k = 1, . . . ,K, ∀s ∈ Sˆ8.
According to Theorem 5.3, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that Assumption 5.1 holds, and user groups are arranged (indexed)
in the increasing order of their desired arrival times: σ1 < · · · < σK. Then, the solution of
[2D-LP(x)] for the equilibrium rush period Sˆ is unique and its cumulative form is given by
F∗(κ, s) = min
∑
k′≤κ
Qk′ , µ · (s − s0)
 ∀κ ∈ [1,K], ∀s ∈ Sˆ (5.15)
Using this analytical solution (5.15), we can show the regularity of the equilibrium flow
pattern. Let
sk ≡ s0 +
∑
k′≤k
Qk′/µ (5.16)
be the time when the cumulative supply, µ · (s− s0), is equal to the cumulative demand ∑k′≤kQk′ .
Then, the following equation holds (see also Figure 4):
F∗(k, sk) − F∗(k − 1, sk−1) =
∫ sk
sk−1
x∗k(s)ds = µ · (sk − sk−1) = Qk ∀k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. (5.17)
where F(0, s0) ≡ 0. This equation leads to the following proposition, that is, the FIFW principle.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose that the assumptions in Proposition 5.1 hold. Then, the equilibrium
flow pattern x∗ has the “sorting” property, such that all users in group k depart from the bottle-
neck in a time interval [sk−1, sk] of length Qk/µ and
s0 < s1 < s2 < · · · < sK−1 < sK = s0 + T. (5.18)
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Figure 5: Optimal departure flow pattern, cost pattern, and resulting arrival flow pattern (K = 3)
The above “sorting” property also implies that the equilibrium cost pattern v∗ and the asso-
ciated queuing delays u∗ can be uniquely determined. Specifically, the following users’ optimal
choice condition within each group must hold:
v∗k = u
∗(s) + ck(s) ∀s ∈ [sk−1, sk], ∀k ∈ K . (5.19)
Then we have
v∗k := v
∗
k+1 − ck+1(sk) + ck(sk) ∀k = 1, . . . ,K − 1. (5.20)
The recursive equation (5.20) together with a boundary condition (e.g., the queuing delay for the
last user in group K is zero, v∗K = cK(s0 + T)), can be solved easily. Note that the Eq.(5.20) can
also be represented as analytical formulas of v∗ and s0 because it consists of simple addition and
substitution operations. Ultimately, the queuing delay u can be obtained analytically by using
Eq.(5.19). In addition, as mentioned in the previous section, the cumulative arrival curve can be
constructed using the optimal solution (x∗,u∗) above. Figure 5 shows the relationships between
the optimal departure flow pattern, the cost pattern, and the resulting arrival flow pattern for the
simplest case (i.e., linear schedule delay cost function).
8Because dF(κ, s) = 0 for interval κ ∈ (k, k + 1),∀k = 1, . . . ,K − 1, by definition, the function c(κ, s) can be set
arbitrary except for the values at the points κ = k, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K.
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<latexit sha1_base64="0VwMZTjiNtc89 Sb7NndSbBJm9JM=">AAACtXicjZHPShtRFMY/p1pjapvYbgJuQoMlhRLOiBDpKuCmS6NNI pgYZiY39pL5x8xN0A7xAfoCXXRV0UUp9iXc9AW68BGkywhuuuiZyUCxou0ZZu653z2/c+6 ZY/q2DBXRxYz2YHbu4XxmIfto8fGTXH7paTP0hoElGpZne8GOaYTClq5oKKlsseMHwnBM W7TMwUZ83hqJIJSe+1Yd+qLjGPuu7EvLUCx184W2KZTRjQbj/l4kxuW28ENpe+7Lbr5EFU qseNvRU6eE1Da9/Dna6MGDhSEcCLhQ7NswEPKzCx0En7UOItYC9mRyLjBGltkhRwmOMFgd 8Hefd7up6vI+zhkmtMVVbH4DJotYoR/0hSb0nb7SJf26M1eU5IjvcsirOWWF3819KGxf/ 5NyeFV494e6h/BxgD7fL/4DIV5xLec/uLhXxdx60qNk2k+UuHtryo/ef5xsv95aiV7QMf3 kvj/TBZ1z5+7oyjqti61PyPLg9L/HdNtprlZ0quj1tVJtPR1hBst4jjLPqYoa3mATDa57h BOc4ZtW1TpaT+tPQ7WZlHmGG6Z5vwFEUp9Q</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="0VwMZTjiNtc89 Sb7NndSbBJm9JM=">AAACtXicjZHPShtRFMY/p1pjapvYbgJuQoMlhRLOiBDpKuCmS6NNI pgYZiY39pL5x8xN0A7xAfoCXXRV0UUp9iXc9AW68BGkywhuuuiZyUCxou0ZZu653z2/c+6 ZY/q2DBXRxYz2YHbu4XxmIfto8fGTXH7paTP0hoElGpZne8GOaYTClq5oKKlsseMHwnBM W7TMwUZ83hqJIJSe+1Yd+qLjGPuu7EvLUCx184W2KZTRjQbj/l4kxuW28ENpe+7Lbr5EFU qseNvRU6eE1Da9/Dna6MGDhSEcCLhQ7NswEPKzCx0En7UOItYC9mRyLjBGltkhRwmOMFgd 8Hefd7up6vI+zhkmtMVVbH4DJotYoR/0hSb0nb7SJf26M1eU5IjvcsirOWWF3819KGxf/ 5NyeFV494e6h/BxgD7fL/4DIV5xLec/uLhXxdx60qNk2k+UuHtryo/ef5xsv95aiV7QMf3 kvj/TBZ1z5+7oyjqti61PyPLg9L/HdNtprlZ0quj1tVJtPR1hBst4jjLPqYoa3mATDa57h BOc4ZtW1TpaT+tPQ7WZlHmGG6Z5vwFEUp9Q</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="0VwMZTjiNtc89 Sb7NndSbBJm9JM=">AAACtXicjZHPShtRFMY/p1pjapvYbgJuQoMlhRLOiBDpKuCmS6NNI pgYZiY39pL5x8xN0A7xAfoCXXRV0UUp9iXc9AW68BGkywhuuuiZyUCxou0ZZu653z2/c+6 ZY/q2DBXRxYz2YHbu4XxmIfto8fGTXH7paTP0hoElGpZne8GOaYTClq5oKKlsseMHwnBM W7TMwUZ83hqJIJSe+1Yd+qLjGPuu7EvLUCx184W2KZTRjQbj/l4kxuW28ENpe+7Lbr5EFU qseNvRU6eE1Da9/Dna6MGDhSEcCLhQ7NswEPKzCx0En7UOItYC9mRyLjBGltkhRwmOMFgd 8Hefd7up6vI+zhkmtMVVbH4DJotYoR/0hSb0nb7SJf26M1eU5IjvcsirOWWF3819KGxf/ 5NyeFV494e6h/BxgD7fL/4DIV5xLec/uLhXxdx60qNk2k+UuHtryo/ef5xsv95aiV7QMf3 kvj/TBZ1z5+7oyjqti61PyPLg9L/HdNtprlZ0quj1tVJtPR1hBst4jjLPqYoa3mATDa57h BOc4ZtW1TpaT+tPQ7WZlHmGG6Z5vwFEUp9Q</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="0VwMZTjiNtc89 Sb7NndSbBJm9JM=">AAACtXicjZHPShtRFMY/p1pjapvYbgJuQoMlhRLOiBDpKuCmS6NNI pgYZiY39pL5x8xN0A7xAfoCXXRV0UUp9iXc9AW68BGkywhuuuiZyUCxou0ZZu653z2/c+6 ZY/q2DBXRxYz2YHbu4XxmIfto8fGTXH7paTP0hoElGpZne8GOaYTClq5oKKlsseMHwnBM W7TMwUZ83hqJIJSe+1Yd+qLjGPuu7EvLUCx184W2KZTRjQbj/l4kxuW28ENpe+7Lbr5EFU qseNvRU6eE1Da9/Dna6MGDhSEcCLhQ7NswEPKzCx0En7UOItYC9mRyLjBGltkhRwmOMFgd 8Hefd7up6vI+zhkmtMVVbH4DJotYoR/0hSb0nb7SJf26M1eU5IjvcsirOWWF3819KGxf/ 5NyeFV494e6h/BxgD7fL/4DIV5xLec/uLhXxdx60qNk2k+UuHtryo/ef5xsv95aiV7QMf3 kvj/TBZ1z5+7oyjqti61PyPLg9L/HdNtprlZ0quj1tVJtPR1hBst4jjLPqYoa3mATDa57h BOc4ZtW1TpaT+tPQ7WZlHmGG6Z5vwFEUp9Q</latexit>
 k+1 f e(✏)
<latexit sha1_base64="0I7zEQ862Ojop 9HXEPsEoV8xlsw=">AAACt3icjZHNTttAEMf/GNqmKS0pXCq4ICIQVVE0rpAaOEXqpUcSG kAiYNnuBlbxF/YmIliROPMCHHpqpSJVPcA7cOEFOPAIFUcqceHA2LFUAerHWPbO/nd+Mzs eK3BkpIguBrTBoUePn+Se5p8NP38xUng5uhL57dAWddt3/HDNMiPhSE/UlVSOWAtCYbqW I1at1vvkfLUjwkj63kfVDcSGa255siltU7FkFMYbllCmEbfe6L3mZix6sw0RRNLxvddGoU glSm3yoaNnThGZLfmFUzTwCT5stOFCwINi34GJiJ916CAErG0gZi1kT6bnAj3kmW1zlOAI k9UWf7d4t56pHu+TnFFK21zF4TdkchLTdE7f6YrO6Af9pJs/5orTHMldurxafVYExsjBq +Xrf1Iurwrbv6m/EAF20eT7JX8gwhzXcv+DS3pVzJXTHiXTQaok3dt9vrN3eLW8WJuOZ+g rXXLfX+iCTrlzr/PL/lYVtc/I8+D0+2N66Ky8LelU0qvzxUo5G2EOE5jCLM/pHSr4gCXUu e4+jnCME21BM7Smtt0P1QYyZgx3TNu5BWiyn8A=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="0I7zEQ862Ojop 9HXEPsEoV8xlsw=">AAACt3icjZHNTttAEMf/GNqmKS0pXCq4ICIQVVE0rpAaOEXqpUcSG kAiYNnuBlbxF/YmIliROPMCHHpqpSJVPcA7cOEFOPAIFUcqceHA2LFUAerHWPbO/nd+Mzs eK3BkpIguBrTBoUePn+Se5p8NP38xUng5uhL57dAWddt3/HDNMiPhSE/UlVSOWAtCYbqW I1at1vvkfLUjwkj63kfVDcSGa255siltU7FkFMYbllCmEbfe6L3mZix6sw0RRNLxvddGoU glSm3yoaNnThGZLfmFUzTwCT5stOFCwINi34GJiJ916CAErG0gZi1kT6bnAj3kmW1zlOAI k9UWf7d4t56pHu+TnFFK21zF4TdkchLTdE7f6YrO6Af9pJs/5orTHMldurxafVYExsjBq +Xrf1Iurwrbv6m/EAF20eT7JX8gwhzXcv+DS3pVzJXTHiXTQaok3dt9vrN3eLW8WJuOZ+g rXXLfX+iCTrlzr/PL/lYVtc/I8+D0+2N66Ky8LelU0qvzxUo5G2EOE5jCLM/pHSr4gCXUu e4+jnCME21BM7Smtt0P1QYyZgx3TNu5BWiyn8A=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="0I7zEQ862Ojop 9HXEPsEoV8xlsw=">AAACt3icjZHNTttAEMf/GNqmKS0pXCq4ICIQVVE0rpAaOEXqpUcSG kAiYNnuBlbxF/YmIliROPMCHHpqpSJVPcA7cOEFOPAIFUcqceHA2LFUAerHWPbO/nd+Mzs eK3BkpIguBrTBoUePn+Se5p8NP38xUng5uhL57dAWddt3/HDNMiPhSE/UlVSOWAtCYbqW I1at1vvkfLUjwkj63kfVDcSGa255siltU7FkFMYbllCmEbfe6L3mZix6sw0RRNLxvddGoU glSm3yoaNnThGZLfmFUzTwCT5stOFCwINi34GJiJ916CAErG0gZi1kT6bnAj3kmW1zlOAI k9UWf7d4t56pHu+TnFFK21zF4TdkchLTdE7f6YrO6Af9pJs/5orTHMldurxafVYExsjBq +Xrf1Iurwrbv6m/EAF20eT7JX8gwhzXcv+DS3pVzJXTHiXTQaok3dt9vrN3eLW8WJuOZ+g rXXLfX+iCTrlzr/PL/lYVtc/I8+D0+2N66Ky8LelU0qvzxUo5G2EOE5jCLM/pHSr4gCXUu e4+jnCME21BM7Smtt0P1QYyZgx3TNu5BWiyn8A=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="0I7zEQ862Ojop 9HXEPsEoV8xlsw=">AAACt3icjZHNTttAEMf/GNqmKS0pXCq4ICIQVVE0rpAaOEXqpUcSG kAiYNnuBlbxF/YmIliROPMCHHpqpSJVPcA7cOEFOPAIFUcqceHA2LFUAerHWPbO/nd+Mzs eK3BkpIguBrTBoUePn+Se5p8NP38xUng5uhL57dAWddt3/HDNMiPhSE/UlVSOWAtCYbqW I1at1vvkfLUjwkj63kfVDcSGa255siltU7FkFMYbllCmEbfe6L3mZix6sw0RRNLxvddGoU glSm3yoaNnThGZLfmFUzTwCT5stOFCwINi34GJiJ916CAErG0gZi1kT6bnAj3kmW1zlOAI k9UWf7d4t56pHu+TnFFK21zF4TdkchLTdE7f6YrO6Af9pJs/5orTHMldurxafVYExsjBq +Xrf1Iurwrbv6m/EAF20eT7JX8gwhzXcv+DS3pVzJXTHiXTQaok3dt9vrN3eLW8WJuOZ+g rXXLfX+iCTrlzr/PL/lYVtc/I8+D0+2N66Ky8LelU0qvzxUo5G2EOE5jCLM/pHSr4gCXUu e4+jnCME21BM7Smtt0P1QYyZgx3TNu5BWiyn8A=</latexit>
 k+1 f l(✏)
<latexit sha1_base64="FZ6fgtZB+g3zX3ZlF3mRStrCgzg=">AAACuHicjZHNSuRAEM f/xu/R1VEvghdxUJRdhsoiKHMSvHj0Y0cFR2eTbM9sM50PkszgGObg1Rfw4MmFZVm8uM/gxRfw4COIRwUvHqxkAqKyu1ZIuvrf9avqSpmekkFIdN2hdXZ19/T29WcGBj8MDWdHRjcDt+ 5bomi5yvW3TSMQSjqiGMpQiW3PF4ZtKrFl1pbj862G8APpOl/Cpid2baPqyIq0jJClcnaiVDVs2yhHtY96q7IXqdZsSXiBVK4zV87mKE+JTb519NTJIbVVN3uBEr7BhYU6bAg4CNlXM BDwswMdBI+1XUSs+ezJ5FyghQyzdY4SHGGwWuNvlXc7qerwPs4ZJLTFVRS/PpOTmKYr+k13dElndEOPf80VJTniuzR5Ndus8MrDR+MbD/+lbF5DfH+m/kF42EeF7xf/gQCfuJb9Di7u NWRuMelRMu0lSty91eYbB8d3G4X16WiGftAt931K13TBnTuNe+vnmlg/QYYHp78e01tn83Nep7y+Np9bWkxH2IcJTGGW57SAJaxgFUWue4hfOMcfraB91aqabIdqHSkzhhem+U+NeKA4 </latexit><latexit sha1_base64="FZ6fgtZB+g3zX3ZlF3mRStrCgzg=">AAACuHicjZHNSuRAEM f/xu/R1VEvghdxUJRdhsoiKHMSvHj0Y0cFR2eTbM9sM50PkszgGObg1Rfw4MmFZVm8uM/gxRfw4COIRwUvHqxkAqKyu1ZIuvrf9avqSpmekkFIdN2hdXZ19/T29WcGBj8MDWdHRjcDt+ 5bomi5yvW3TSMQSjqiGMpQiW3PF4ZtKrFl1pbj862G8APpOl/Cpid2baPqyIq0jJClcnaiVDVs2yhHtY96q7IXqdZsSXiBVK4zV87mKE+JTb519NTJIbVVN3uBEr7BhYU6bAg4CNlXM BDwswMdBI+1XUSs+ezJ5FyghQyzdY4SHGGwWuNvlXc7qerwPs4ZJLTFVRS/PpOTmKYr+k13dElndEOPf80VJTniuzR5Ndus8MrDR+MbD/+lbF5DfH+m/kF42EeF7xf/gQCfuJb9Di7u NWRuMelRMu0lSty91eYbB8d3G4X16WiGftAt931K13TBnTuNe+vnmlg/QYYHp78e01tn83Nep7y+Np9bWkxH2IcJTGGW57SAJaxgFUWue4hfOMcfraB91aqabIdqHSkzhhem+U+NeKA4 </latexit><latexit sha1_base64="FZ6fgtZB+g3zX3ZlF3mRStrCgzg=">AAACuHicjZHNSuRAEM f/xu/R1VEvghdxUJRdhsoiKHMSvHj0Y0cFR2eTbM9sM50PkszgGObg1Rfw4MmFZVm8uM/gxRfw4COIRwUvHqxkAqKyu1ZIuvrf9avqSpmekkFIdN2hdXZ19/T29WcGBj8MDWdHRjcDt+ 5bomi5yvW3TSMQSjqiGMpQiW3PF4ZtKrFl1pbj862G8APpOl/Cpid2baPqyIq0jJClcnaiVDVs2yhHtY96q7IXqdZsSXiBVK4zV87mKE+JTb519NTJIbVVN3uBEr7BhYU6bAg4CNlXM BDwswMdBI+1XUSs+ezJ5FyghQyzdY4SHGGwWuNvlXc7qerwPs4ZJLTFVRS/PpOTmKYr+k13dElndEOPf80VJTniuzR5Ndus8MrDR+MbD/+lbF5DfH+m/kF42EeF7xf/gQCfuJb9Di7u NWRuMelRMu0lSty91eYbB8d3G4X16WiGftAt931K13TBnTuNe+vnmlg/QYYHp78e01tn83Nep7y+Np9bWkxH2IcJTGGW57SAJaxgFUWue4hfOMcfraB91aqabIdqHSkzhhem+U+NeKA4 </latexit><latexit sha1_base64="FZ6fgtZB+g3zX3ZlF3mRStrCgzg=">AAACuHicjZHNSuRAEM f/xu/R1VEvghdxUJRdhsoiKHMSvHj0Y0cFR2eTbM9sM50PkszgGObg1Rfw4MmFZVm8uM/gxRfw4COIRwUvHqxkAqKyu1ZIuvrf9avqSpmekkFIdN2hdXZ19/T29WcGBj8MDWdHRjcDt+ 5bomi5yvW3TSMQSjqiGMpQiW3PF4ZtKrFl1pbj862G8APpOl/Cpid2baPqyIq0jJClcnaiVDVs2yhHtY96q7IXqdZsSXiBVK4zV87mKE+JTb519NTJIbVVN3uBEr7BhYU6bAg4CNlXM BDwswMdBI+1XUSs+ezJ5FyghQyzdY4SHGGwWuNvlXc7qerwPs4ZJLTFVRS/PpOTmKYr+k13dElndEOPf80VJTniuzR5Ndus8MrDR+MbD/+lbF5DfH+m/kF42EeF7xf/gQCfuJb9Di7u NWRuMelRMu0lSty91eYbB8d3G4X16WiGftAt931K13TBnTuNe+vnmlg/QYYHp78e01tn83Nep7y+Np9bWkxH2IcJTGGW57SAJaxgFUWue4hfOMcfraB91aqabIdqHSkzhhem+U+NeKA4 </latexit>
 k f l(✏)
<latexit sha1_base64="AuU5gVWuro3lTh1ASwOTImo1GZg=">AAACtnicjZFBSxtREM f/bqu1adVoLy29SIOiIGFWCgZPgV56jEmjgtGwu77ER97uPnY3oXYJvfcL9NBTCx5EaD+El36BHvIRxGMELx6c3SyIFVtn2X3z/m9+M292bK1kGBENxoxHj8cnnkw+zT17PjU9k5+d2w z9buCIuuMrP9i2rVAo6Yl6JCMltnUgLNdWYsvuvEvOt3oiCKXvfYgOtdh1rbYnW9KxIpaa+VeNtuW6VjPu9Ft7seovNYQOpfK95Wa+QEVKbf6uY2ZOAZlV/PwpGtiHDwdduBDwELGvY CHkZwcmCJq1XcSsBezJ9FygjxyzXY4SHGGx2uFvm3c7merxPskZprTDVRS/AZPzWKA/dExD+k0ndEZX9+aK0xzJXQ55tUes0M2ZLy9rl/+lXF4jHNxQ/yA0PqLF90v+QIgVruU+gEt6 jZgrpT1KpnWqJN07I7736euwtl5diBfpB51z399pQKfcude7cI42RPUbcjw48+8x3XU2V4smFc2Nt4VyKRvhJF7jDZZ4Tmso4z0qqHPdzzjCT/wySsaeIYz2KNQYy5gXuGWGvgZoRp/I </latexit><latexit sha1_base64="AuU5gVWuro3lTh1ASwOTImo1GZg=">AAACtnicjZFBSxtREM f/bqu1adVoLy29SIOiIGFWCgZPgV56jEmjgtGwu77ER97uPnY3oXYJvfcL9NBTCx5EaD+El36BHvIRxGMELx6c3SyIFVtn2X3z/m9+M292bK1kGBENxoxHj8cnnkw+zT17PjU9k5+d2w z9buCIuuMrP9i2rVAo6Yl6JCMltnUgLNdWYsvuvEvOt3oiCKXvfYgOtdh1rbYnW9KxIpaa+VeNtuW6VjPu9Ft7seovNYQOpfK95Wa+QEVKbf6uY2ZOAZlV/PwpGtiHDwdduBDwELGvY CHkZwcmCJq1XcSsBezJ9FygjxyzXY4SHGGx2uFvm3c7merxPskZprTDVRS/AZPzWKA/dExD+k0ndEZX9+aK0xzJXQ55tUes0M2ZLy9rl/+lXF4jHNxQ/yA0PqLF90v+QIgVruU+gEt6 jZgrpT1KpnWqJN07I7736euwtl5diBfpB51z399pQKfcude7cI42RPUbcjw48+8x3XU2V4smFc2Nt4VyKRvhJF7jDZZ4Tmso4z0qqHPdzzjCT/wySsaeIYz2KNQYy5gXuGWGvgZoRp/I </latexit><latexit sha1_base64="AuU5gVWuro3lTh1ASwOTImo1GZg=">AAACtnicjZFBSxtREM f/bqu1adVoLy29SIOiIGFWCgZPgV56jEmjgtGwu77ER97uPnY3oXYJvfcL9NBTCx5EaD+El36BHvIRxGMELx6c3SyIFVtn2X3z/m9+M292bK1kGBENxoxHj8cnnkw+zT17PjU9k5+d2w z9buCIuuMrP9i2rVAo6Yl6JCMltnUgLNdWYsvuvEvOt3oiCKXvfYgOtdh1rbYnW9KxIpaa+VeNtuW6VjPu9Ft7seovNYQOpfK95Wa+QEVKbf6uY2ZOAZlV/PwpGtiHDwdduBDwELGvY CHkZwcmCJq1XcSsBezJ9FygjxyzXY4SHGGx2uFvm3c7merxPskZprTDVRS/AZPzWKA/dExD+k0ndEZX9+aK0xzJXQ55tUes0M2ZLy9rl/+lXF4jHNxQ/yA0PqLF90v+QIgVruU+gEt6 jZgrpT1KpnWqJN07I7736euwtl5diBfpB51z399pQKfcude7cI42RPUbcjw48+8x3XU2V4smFc2Nt4VyKRvhJF7jDZZ4Tmso4z0qqHPdzzjCT/wySsaeIYz2KNQYy5gXuGWGvgZoRp/I </latexit><latexit sha1_base64="AuU5gVWuro3lTh1ASwOTImo1GZg=">AAACtnicjZFBSxtREM f/bqu1adVoLy29SIOiIGFWCgZPgV56jEmjgtGwu77ER97uPnY3oXYJvfcL9NBTCx5EaD+El36BHvIRxGMELx6c3SyIFVtn2X3z/m9+M292bK1kGBENxoxHj8cnnkw+zT17PjU9k5+d2w z9buCIuuMrP9i2rVAo6Yl6JCMltnUgLNdWYsvuvEvOt3oiCKXvfYgOtdh1rbYnW9KxIpaa+VeNtuW6VjPu9Ft7seovNYQOpfK95Wa+QEVKbf6uY2ZOAZlV/PwpGtiHDwdduBDwELGvY CHkZwcmCJq1XcSsBezJ9FygjxyzXY4SHGGx2uFvm3c7merxPskZprTDVRS/AZPzWKA/dExD+k0ndEZX9+aK0xzJXQ55tUes0M2ZLy9rl/+lXF4jHNxQ/yA0PqLF90v+QIgVruU+gEt6 jZgrpT1KpnWqJN07I7736euwtl5diBfpB51z399pQKfcude7cI42RPUbcjw48+8x3XU2V4smFc2Nt4VyKRvhJF7jDZZ4Tmso4z0qqHPdzzjCT/wySsaeIYz2KNQYy5gXuGWGvgZoRp/I </latexit>
✏  0
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Figure 6: Schedule delay , heterogeneities k, and schedule delay cost
6. Analysis of model with heterogeneous value of time
In this section, we examine DTCE models to which the optimal transport theory cannot be
directly applied. The problem [2D-LP(x)] is still the equivalent LP problem of the (part of)
equilibrium conditions; however, the schedule delay cost function of the models does not satisfy
the Monge property. Nevertheless, we show that we may be able to solve the equilibrium problem
analytically by using an approach that combines the optimal transport theory with a hierarchical
decomposition. The role of the decomposition in the proposed approach is to generate the lower-
level (or sub-) problems that can be analytically solved by invoking the optimal transport theory.
Subsequently, owing to the analytical solutions of the lower-level problems, we may solve the
original problem (i.e., the upper-level or master problem) analytically.
As a typical model of the above situation, we consider the DTCE models in which users have
the same preferred departure time, σ, but are classified into K groups (types) differentiated by
schedule delay cost functions. The schedule delay cost for type k users with departure time, s,
from the bottleneck is denoted by ck(), where  ≡ s−σ is the schedule delay. The function ck()
in this section is assumed to have the following form:
ck(s) =
βk f e() if  ≤ 0 (early arrival)γk f l() if  ≥ 0 (late arrival) , (6.1a)
f e(0) = f l(0) = 0 (6.1b)
which includes the schedule delay cost functions assumed in conventional models with heteroge-
neous users (e.g., Cohen, 1987; Arnott et al., 1988, 1992, 1994; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011;
Ramadurai et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2015; Takayama and Kuwahara, 2017) as special cases. For
notational simplicity, the preferred departure time, σ, will be set to zero hereafter (i.e.,  = s).
In Sections 6.1 and 6.2, we first analyze the models with no late and early arrivals, respec-
tively. These analyses correspond to solving the lower-level problems of the original problem
[2D-LP(x)], which will be formally discussed in the subsequent section. In Section 6.3, we an-
alyze the overall (or uppder-level) problem by exploiting the results in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. In
Section 6.4, we compare the proposed approach with a semi-analytical approach in the literature.
6.1. Properties of models with no late arrivals
We first restrict ourselves to the analysis of models with the following assumption:
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Assumption 6.1. f e : R → R is a continuous decreasing function of  for all  ≤ 0 and
f e(0) = 0, f l()→ +∞ for all  > 0 (i.e., late arrival is prohibited).
Lemma 6.1. Suppose that Assumption 6.1 holds and that user groups are arranged (indexed) in
the decreasing order of their value of time parameters for early arrivals: β1 > β2 > · · · > βK > 0.
Then the function ck(s) defined by (6.1) satisfies the strict “inverse” Monge property for s ≤ 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
As we have seen in Section 4, the DTCE problem can be obtained by solving the LP problem
[2D-LP(x)], whose objective is to minimize the total schedule delay cost. Because all users
have the same preferred departure time σ, the departure times that are closer to σ are chosen at
equilibrium. Thus, we obtain the following apparent property of an equilibrium departure time
window:
Lemma 6.2. Under Assumption 6.1, the optimal solution x∗ of [2D-LP(x)] satisfies
∑
k∈K x∗k(s) = µ if s ∈ Sˆ ⊂ S∑
k∈K x∗k(s) = 0 otherwise
(6.2)
where Sˆ ≡ [−T, 0] of length T = Q/µ.
These lemmas ensure that [2D-LP(x)] reduces to an optimal transport problem with a strict in-
verse Monge property. However, to use Theorem 5.3 directly, it is convenient to formulate the op-
timal transport problem in its cumulative form with a strict Monge property, as in Subsection 5.2.
To do this, let us reverse the time direction: z ≡ −s. Let c(κ, z) and F(κ, z) = ∑k′≤κ ∫ z0 xk′ (z)dz
be the cost and distribution functions for the time windowZ = [0,T] 3 z, respectively. Without
loss of generality, we also assume that c(κ, z) is a continuous and strict submodular function that
satisfies c(k, z) = ck(z), ∀k = 1, . . . ,K, ∀z ∈ Z. We then have:
min
F∈F
∫
[1,K]×Z
c(κ, z)dF(κ, z) (6.3)
where F ≡ {F(κ,T) = ∑k′≤κQk′ , F(K, t) = µz, ∀κ ∈ [1,K], ∀z ∈ Z} . (6.4)
We further define the time sk when the cumulative supply µz is equal to the cumulative demand∑
k′≤kQk′ , that is,
sk ≡
∑
k′≤k
Qk′/µ. (6.5)
By applying Theorem 5.3 to this problem, the following proposition is obtained:
Proposition 6.1. Suppose that Assumption 6.1 holds. Then, the flow pattern of the departure
time choice equilibrium with schedule delay cost function (6.1) has the following properties:
(1) The optimal solution of [2D-LP(x)] (i.e., equilibrium flow pattern x∗) is unique and given
by the Fre´chet–Hoeffding distribution.
F∗(κ, z) = min
∑
k′≤κ
Qk′ , µz
 ∀κ ∈ [1,K], ∀z ∈ Z (6.6)
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Figure 7: Graphical representation of the strong duality for [2D-LP(x)] (K = 2, late arrival is prohibited)
(2) The equilibrium flow pattern x∗ has the “sorting” property, such that all users in group
k depart from the bottleneck in a time interval [−sk,−sk−1] of length Qk/µ (i.e., sk =
sk−1 + Qk/µ), and
− T = −sK < −sK−1 < · · · < −s2 < −s1 < −s0 ≡ 0. (6.7)
As in the case of Subsection 5.2, the equilibrium cost pattern v∗ and associated queuing
delays u∗ can be uniquely determined (see Figure 7).
Proposition 6.2. Suppose that Assumption 6.1 holds. Then, the cost pattern of the departure time
choice equilibrium with schedule delay cost function (6.1) is unique and is obtained as follows:
v∗k =
∑
k′≥k
{
βˆk′ f e(−sk′ )
}
∀k ∈ K (6.8)
u∗(s) =
v∗k − βk f e(s) if s ∈ [−sk,−sk−1]0 otherwise ∀k ∈ K (6.9)
where βˆk ≡ βk − βk+1 > 0 and βK+1 ≡ 0.
Proof. See Appendix E.1.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the costs at equilibrium. Specifically, we can see
that the following equation holds:∑
k∈K
(sk − sk−1)v∗k −
∫
S
u∗(s)ds =
∑
k∈K
∫ −sk−1
−sk
ck(s)ds (6.10)
The first term on the LHS of Eq.(6.10) shows the total area of the rectangles below the equilib-
rium trip cost lines (blue bold lines), and the second term shows the red area below the queuing
delay curve (red bold line)9. The equality holds in equilibrium because the difference in the
above-mentioned two areas should be equal to the total area below the schedule delay cost curves
9The red dotted lines in Figure 7 are the so-called isocost queueing curves in the literature (Lindsey, 2004).
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(black bold lines). Furthermore, by recalling that (sk − sk−1) = Qk/µ and multiplying both sides
of Eq.(6.10) by µ, we can see the strong duality for [2D-LP(x)].
Z(x∗) =
∑
k∈K
∫
S
ck(s)x∗k(s)ds = µ
∑
k∈K
∫ −sk−1
−sk
ck(s)ds
=
∑
k∈K
Qkv∗k − µ
∫
S
u∗(s)ds = Zˇ(u∗,v∗). (6.11)
6.2. Properties of models with no early arrivals
In exactly the same manner as we discussed above, we can consider the “reverse” case, in
which the following assumption holds:
Assumption 6.2. f l : R → R is a continuous increasing function of  for all  ≥ 0 and
f l(0) = 0, f e → +∞ for all  < 0 (i.e., early arrival is prohibited).
Although this assumption (no early arrivals) may seem strange, the results for this case together
with the previous (no late arrivals) case can be used as fundamental building blocks for analyzing
more general cases in Subsection 6.3. As in the previous subsection, the following lemma and
propositions hold.
Lemma 6.3. Suppose that Assumption 6.2 holds and that user groups are arranged (indexed) in
the decreasing order of their value of time parameters for early arrivals: γ1 > γ2 > · · · > γK >
0. Then, the function ck(s) defined by (6.1) satisfies the strict Monge property.
Proposition 6.3. Suppose that Assumption 6.2 holds. Then the flow pattern of the departure time
choice equilibrium with schedule delay cost function (6.1) has the following properties:
(1) The optimal solution of [2D-LP(x)] (i.e., equilibrium flow pattern x∗) is unique and given
by the Fre´chet–Hoeffding distribution.
F∗(κ, s) = min
∑
k′≤κ
Qk′ , µs
 ∀κ ∈ [1,K], ∀s ∈ Sˆ (6.12)
where Sˆ ≡ [0,T] of length T = Q/µ.
(2) The equilibrium flow pattern x∗ has the “sorting” property, such that all users in group
k depart from the bottleneck in a time interval [sk−1, sk] of length Qk/µ (i.e., sk = sk−1 +
Qk/µ), and
s0 ≡ 0 < s1 < s2 < · · · < sK−1 < sK = T (6.13)
Proposition 6.4. Suppose that Assumption 6.2 holds. Then, the cost pattern of the departure time
choice equilibrium with schedule delay cost function (6.1) is unique and is obtained as follows:
v∗k =
∑
k′≥k
{
γˆk′ f l(sk′ )
}
∀k ∈ K (6.14)
u∗(s) =
v∗k − γk f l(s) if s ∈ [sk−1, sk]0 otherwise ∀k ∈ K (6.15)
where γˆk ≡ γk − γk+1 > 0 and γK+1 ≡ 0.
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6.3. Properties of models with early and late arrivals
At the beginning of Section 6, we briefly mentioned the role of the decomposition in the
proposed approach, that is, generating lower-level problems that can be solved analytically. As
also noted, the restricted problems examined in the previous two subsections correspond to such
lower-level problems. Here, we formally introduce a hierarchical decomposition of the problem
[2D-LP(x)], and then show how we can solve the original problem (with a general schedule delay
cost function) analytically by exploiting the analytical solutions of the lower-level problems.
Let us consider a general case in which Assumptions 6.1 and 6.2 are relaxed to allow for both
the late and early arrivals.
Assumption 6.3. f e : R → R is a continuous decreasing function of  for all  ≤ 0 and
f e(0) = 0, f l : R→ R is a continuous increasing function of  for all  ≥ 0 and f l(0) = 0.
This assumption implies that the schedule delay cost function is strictly quasiconvex (or uni-
modal), which is weaker than Assumption 5.1, under which it is required to be strictly convex.
To decompose the problem [2D-LP(x)], we introduce an auxiliary variable, Xhk , representing
the total mass of early (if h = e) or late (if h = l) arrival users in group k. In addition, let Sh be
the time duration s ≤ σ if h = e, s > σ if h = l. Then, the problem [2D-LP(x)] can be represented
as
[2D-LP(x, X)] min
x≥0,X≥0 . Z(x,X) ≡
∑
h∈H
∑
k∈K
∫
Sh
ck(s) xk(s)ds (6.16)
subject to
∑
k∈K
xk(s) ≤ µ ∀s ∈ Sh, h ∈ H (6.17)∫
Sh
xk(s)ds = Xhk ∀k ∈ K , h ∈ H (6.18)∑
h∈H
Xhk = Qk ∀k ∈ K (6.19)
where H = {e, l}. The equivalence between [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(x, X)] is easily confirmed
by substituting Eq.(6.18) into Eq.(6.19). Following the problem structure in which the variables
{xk(s)} can be solved if the pattern {Xhk } is given (but not vice versa), the problem [2D-LP(x, X)]
can be further viewed as the following equivalent hierarchical problem:
min
X≥0 .
∑
h∈H
ZM(Xh) (6.20)
subject to Eq. (6.19)
where ZM(Xh) ≡ min
x≥0 . ZS(x | X
h) ≡
∑
k∈K
∫
Sh
ck(s) xk(s)ds (6.21)
subject to Eqs. (6.17) ∀s ∈ Sh and (6.18).
Because the lower-level (or sub-) problems (for h = e and h = l, respectively) are exactly the
same problems discussed in the previous subsections, the optimal solution x∗ (for a given Xh) and
the associated equilibrium cost (i.e., the optimal Lagrange multiplier) (u∗,vh∗) can be obtained
analytically (Propositions 6.1–6.4). These solutions are useful in the following analysis.
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Owing to the strong duality of lower-level problems (i.e., Eq.(6.11)), the upper-level (or
master) problem reduces to the following problem:
min
X≥0 .
∑
h∈H
ZM(Xh) =
∑
h∈H
Zˇ(u∗,vh∗ | Xh)
=
∑
h∈H
−µ∫Sh u∗(s)ds +
∑
k∈K
Xhkv
h∗
k
 (6.22)
subject to Eq. (6.19)
In general, an iterative procedure is required to solve the upper-level problem because the dual
solution (u∗,vh∗) is not expressed as an explicit function of the variable, Xh. However, owing to
the analytical solution obtained in the previous subsections, we can explicitly transform it into a
problem that includes the decision variable Xh.
Recall that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the demand distribution Xh and the
equilibrium departure time vector sh (Propositions 6.1 and 6.3), that is,
sh0 = 0, s
h
1 = X
h
1/µ, . . . , s
h
k =
∑
k′≤k
Xhk′/µ, . . . , s
h
K = T
h ≡
∑
k′≤K
Xhk′/µ. (6.23)
By using these variables and the relationship (6.11), the upper-level problem can be transformed
into the following problem:
min
sh
.
∑
h∈H
ZM(sh) = µ
∑
k∈K
∫ −sek−1
−sek
ck(s)ds + µ
∑
k∈K
∫ slk
slk−1
ck(s)ds (6.24)
subject to 0 ≤ sh1 ≤ · · · ≤ shk ≤ · · · ≤ shK ∀h ∈ H (6.25)
sek + s
l
k =
∑
k≤k′
Qk′/µ ∀k ∈ K (6.26)
It should be noted that this problem is equivalent to [2D-LP(x, X)] and [2D-LP(x)], although it
can also be interpreted as the upper-level problem of the the hierarchical problem. As shown in
Appendix E.2, this problem is a convex programming problem with a strict convex objective
function. Thus, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 6.4. Suppose that Assumption 6.3 holds. The optimal solution of problem (6.24) is
unique.
Proof. See Appendix E.2.
Finally, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6.5. Suppose that Assumption 6.3 holds. Then the flow pattern of the departure time
choice equilibrium with schedule cost function (6.1) has the following properties:
1. The optimal solution of [2D-LP(x)] (i.e., equilibrium flow pattern x∗) is unique.
2. The equilibrium flow pattern x∗ has the “sorting” property, such that all users in group k
depart from the bottleneck in time intervals [shk−1, s
h
k],∀h ∈ H , and
−Te = −seK ≤ · · · ≤ −se1 ≤ 0 ≤ sl1 ≤ · · · ≤ slK = Tl. (6.27)
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Figure 8: Graphical representation of Equation (6.28) (K = 2)
3. If users in all groups depart from the bottleneck both early and late (i.e., strict inequal-
ity holds in condition (6.27)), the equilibrium values of sek and s
l
k are determined by the
following equations:slk + sek =
∑
k′≤kQk′/µ
βˆk f e(−sek) = γˆk f l(slk) (= v∗k − v∗k+1)
∀k ∈ K (6.28)
where v∗K+1 ≡ 0.
Proof. See Appendix E.3.
There are a few remarks. First, the sorting property in this section and the FIFW property seem
to be emerging from different mechanisms (i.e., different types of heterogeneities); however,
our analyses reveal that both sorting patterns can be explained by the Monge property of the
schedule delay cost function in a unified manner. Second, property 3 always holds, for example,
if γk/βk = η (constant) for all k ∈ K , which is a common assumption in the literature (Vickrey,
1973; Arnott et al., 1988, 1992, 1994; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011; Takayama and Kuwahara,
2017) (see Appendix E.3). Third, it is evident that Eq.(6.28) for each k is a simple two equations
with two variables, that is, sek and s
l
k can be easily obtained by independently solving Eq.(6.28)
for each k (see Figure 8). If we assume a piecewise linear schedule delay function (e.g., Arnott
et al., 1988; Liu et al., 2015), Eq.(6.28) reduces to elementary linear equations with two variables,
which obviously implies that an explicit analytical formula for sek and s
l
k is obtained.
6.4. Relation to an existing semi-analytical approach
Before concluding this section, it is worthwhile mentioning a semi-analytical approach pro-
posed by Liu et al. (2015). In their approach, for a given Xh (i.e., the total mass of early or late
arrival users), closed-form trip cost functions are first derived using Arnott et al. (1994)’s analyti-
cal results of the model with a piecewise linear schedule delay function. Then, with these trip cost
functions (or mappings), they create an equivalent VI problem of the morning commute equilib-
rium model. From the discussions in the previous subsection, the correspondence between Liu
et al. (2015)’s and our proposed approaches are clear: solving the lower-level problems (6.21)
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analytically (Sections 6.1 and 6.2) corresponds to a generalized version of the results of Arnott
et al. (1994), and the convex programming problem (6.24), which is an equivalent problem of
the equilibrium model, corresponds to their VI problem. The proposed approach is more general
than Liu et al. (2015)’s approach in the sense that we do not impose the restrictive assumption
on the schedule delay function.
To discern other differences between the two approaches concretely, let us consider the fol-
lowing VI, which is given as the optimality condition of the upper-level problem (6.22):
Find X∗ ∈ X ≡ {X ≥ 0 and Eq.(6.19)} such that∑
h∈H
vh∗(Xh∗) · (Xh − Xh∗) ≥ 0 X ∈ X, (6.29)
where the mapping vh∗(Xh∗) is obtained by applying the envelope theorem to the dual lower-level
problems, i.e., the equilibrium trip cost function: ∇ZM(Xh) = ∇ZS(u∗,vh∗ | Xh) = vh∗(Xh), ∀h ∈
H . This is almost the same as the VI in Liu et al. (2015), except for the measurement unit of
trip cost, that is, the problem (6.29) is time-based but that in Liu et al. (2015) is monetary-based.
Although the monetary- and time-based formulations can be transformed in to each other by
changing the scale of schedule penalty coefficients βk and γk for the case of Liu et al. (2015), the
mathematical properties of the VIs are quite different10.
More specifically, problem (6.29) has desirable properties (see Appendix E.4 for the proofs).
The mapping of problem (6.29) is strictly monotone; if the schedule delay function is continu-
ously differentiable, the mapping of problem (6.29) is symmetric and thus a scalar potential exists
for the vector field vh∗(Xh∗), that is,∑
h∈H
∮
0→Xh
vh∗(ω)dω
= ∑
h∈H
ZM(Xh)
 . (6.30)
Therefore, it is easy to obtain the uniqueness of the solutions. Contrarily, the mapping of Liu
et al. (2015)’s VI is not monotone; it is difficult to establish the uniqueness property of the VI11.
Further, note that the monetary-based VI is not integrable (i.e., it does not reduce to an equivalent
LP formulation as does [2D-LP(x)]); thus, the theory of optimal transport and efficient solution
methods of LP problems are not applicable to it. Note that in Chen et al. (2015) the time-based
version of Liu et al. (2015)’s VI was studied; it might be reduced to an optimization problem;
however they show neither convex programming nor analytical solutions.
In summary, the present approach is a more powerful and promising way to address more gen-
eral problems. As an example, we will analyze an extended problem with more heterogeneities
in the next section.
7. Analysis of models with two types of cost heterogeneity
This section demonstrates that the proposed approach is applicable to cases with more gen-
eral user heterogeneity. Specifically, we here consider a generalized DTCE model with two types
10A similar conclusion has been observed in (multiclass) static traffic assignment problems (e.g., Larsson et al., 2002).
11 Note that the proof of the uniqueness property in Liu et al. (2015) is incorrect. Specifically, Theorem 2.3 in More´
(1974), which was employed in Liu et al. (2015) for the proof, states that an NCP has at most one solution if the mapping
is a P-function, i.e., the P-function property does not guarantee the uniqueness of VIs when their feasible region is not
a positive orthant; this statement together with the fact that the feasible region of Liu et al. (2015)’s VI is not a positive
orthant but a simplex means that Liu et al. (2015)’s proof cannot be valid for their VI.
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of cost heterogeneities. We then characterize an equilibrium user sorting pattern and obtain an
analytical solution by employing both the three-dimensional Monge property and the decompo-
sition of the LP formulation of the model.
7.1. Review of the N-dimensional optimal transport theory
Before introducing the generalized problem, we briefly show that the Monge property and
related useful theorems can be extended to N-dimensional transportation problems. For example,
the three-dimensional transportation problem in a discrete space setting is formulated as follows:
[3D-OTP] min
x≥0 . Z3D(x) ≡
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
ci, j,kxi, j,k (7.1)
subject to
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
xi, j,k = Si ∀i ∈ I (7.2)∑
i∈I
∑
k∈K
xi, j,k = R j ∀ j ∈ J (7.3)∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
xi, j,k = Qk ∀k ∈ K (7.4)
where S,R, and Q are given constants satisfying
∑
i∈I Si =
∑
j∈J R j =
∑
k∈K Qk.
The Monge property for higher-dimensional arrays is as follows.
Definition. Let C be an N-dimensional array of size m1×m2×· · ·×mN. C is termed as a Monge
array, if for all in = 1, 2, . . . ,mn, jn = 1, 2, . . . ,mn, n = 1, 2, . . . ,N,
c[s1, s2, . . . , sN] + c[t1, t2, . . . , tN] ≤ c[i1, i2, . . . , iN] + c[ j1, j2, . . . , jN] (7.5)
where sn ≡ min(in, jn), tn ≡ max(in, jn) for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N.
Note that, as shown in Aggarwal and Park (1988), an N-dimensional array C is a Monge
array if and only if, every two-dimensional submatrix is a Monge matrix. Furthermore, the
natural extension of the northwest corner rule solves the problem in a greedy manner without
explicit values of cost coefficients if C is a Monge array (Bein et al., 1995)12.
As in the two-dimensional case, the continuous Monge property is characterized by a sub-
modular function.
Definition. A function f : RN → R is said to satisfy the N-dimensional continuous Monge
property, if f is submodular with respect to any two of its arguments:
f (x ∧ y) + f (x ∨ y) ≤ f (x) + f (y) ∀x,y ∈ RN (7.6)
where x ∧ y and x ∨ y denote the componentwise maximum/minimum of x and y, respectively:
x ∧ y ≡ (max{x1, y1},max{x2, y2}, . . . ,max{xN, yN}) for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N
x ∨ y ≡ (min{x1, y1},min{x2, y2}, . . . ,min{xN, yN}) for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N.
12Unlike the two-dimensional case, the problem with an inverse Monge array cannot be solved in a greedy way.
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Figure 9: Spatial setting inside the city
Then, Tchen (1980) showed that Theorem 5.3 can be generalized for an N-dimensional case.
Theorem 7.1. (Tchen, 1980) Let F1, . . . ,FN be distribution functions on R. Furthermore, sup-
pose that supF∈F (F1,...,FN)
∫
RN
c(x1, . . . , xN)dF(x1, . . . , xN) < ∞ and a function c : RN → R
satisfies the continuous Monge property. Then, the Fre´chet–Hoeffding distribution:
F∗(x1, . . . , xN) = min{F1(x1), . . . ,FN(xN)} ∀(x1, . . . , xN) ∈ RN (7.7)
is an optimal solution for the following problem:
min
F∈F (F1,...,FN)
∫
RN
c(x1, . . . , xN)dF(x1, . . . , xN). (7.8)
7.2. Simultaneous choice equilibrium model of departure time, location, and job choices
We show a simultaneous choice equilibrium model of departure time, residential location,
and job choices as a generalized DTCE model with two types of cost heterogeneity. Consider a
long narrow city with a spaceless central business district (CBD) where all the job opportunities
are located. The CBD is located at the edge of the city, and J discrete residential locations are
indexed sequentially from the CBD in decreasing order: J, . . . , 1 (Figure 9). We denote the set of
locations using J ≡ {1, . . . , J}. The free-flow travel time between location j and the CBD is l j,
and the maximum allowable number of users who live in each location j ∈ J is R j. There are K
types of jobs at the CBD, and the labor demand of each job k ∈ K ≡ {1, . . . ,K} is given by Qk.
The road has a single bottleneck with capacity µ just upstream of the CBD; thus, all users must
pass through this bottleneck to commute.
There are Q ex-ante identical users in the city. Each user makes departure time, residential
location, and job choices to maximize his/her utility. We assume that a user’s preference is
quasilinear (i.e., the utility function is linear in queuing time units), and let wk, r j, and u(s) be the
wage of job k, land rent at location j, and queuing delay at time s, respectively. Then, the utility
is defined as follows:
wk − r j − (c j,k(s) + u(s)) (7.9)
where c j,k(s) is a “commuting disutility” (a generalization of schedule delay cost) with two types
of heterogeneity j and k, which will be specified later. Note that all terms in Equation (7.9) are
measured in queuing time units.
By combining a user’s optimal choice condition and the equilibrium condition in each market,
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the equilibrium condition is given as follows:V = wk − r j − u(s) − c j,k(s) if x j,k(s) > 0V ≥ wk − r j − u(s) − c j,k(s) if x j,k(s) = 0 ∀ j ∈ J , ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ S (7.10)
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K x j,k(s) = µ if u(s) > 0∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K x j,k(s) ≤ µ if u(s) = 0
∀s ∈ S (7.11)
∑
k∈K
∫
S x j,k(s)ds = R j if r j > 0∑
k∈K
∫
S x j,k(s)ds ≤ R j if r j = 0
∀ j ∈ J (7.12)
∑
j∈J
∫
S x j,k(s)ds = Qk if wk > 0∑
j∈J
∫
S x j,k(s)ds ≥ Qk if wk = 0
∀k ∈ K (7.13)
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
∫
S
x j,k(s)ds = Q (7.14)
where V represents the equilibrium utility level. The first condition (7.10) is the user’s optimal
choice condition, the second condition (7.11) is the queuing delay condition, and the third (7.12)
and fourth (7.13) are the market clearing (or demand-supply equilibrium) conditions for land use
and job markets, respectively.
This model is a variant of the DTCE models that include the location choice of users, for
example, Arnott (1998); Gubins and Verhoef (2014); Takayama and Kuwahara (2017). To keep
the model compact, we assume that the wage wk is dependent only on demand-supply conditions
(7.13) and abstract from the effects of the productivity of firms or other realistic determinants
of the wage. The job-location choice modeling in our formulation corresponds to the celebrated
Herbert–Stevens model (Herbert and Stevens, 1960; Wheaton, 1974; Berliant and Tabuchi, 2018)
in the urban economics literature. Note that it might be considered that the simultaneous equi-
librium model of the different time scale choices is unrealistic, even though their interactions
are important factors in relation to appropriate long-term policies (see Osawa et al., 2018, for an
example). However, as shown in the next subsection, we can convert the problem to a bi-level
problem where the upper-level (or long-run) problem is the job-location choice problem and
the lower-level (or short-term) problem is the departure time choice problem. As such, the two
problems can be analyzed sequentially.
In parallel with the discussion in the previous sections, this equilibrium model is equivalently
written as an LP problem.
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Proposition 7.1. Consider the following infinite-dimensional linear programming problem:
[3D-LP(x)] min
x≥0 . Z(x) ≡
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
∫
S
c j,k(s)x j,k(s)ds (7.15)
subject to
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
x j,k(s) ≤ µ ∀s ∈ S (7.16)
∑
k∈K
∫
S
x j,k(s)ds ≤ R j ∀ j ∈ J , (7.17)∑
j∈J
∫
S
x j,k(s)ds ≥ Qk ∀k ∈ K . (7.18)
with
∑
j∈J R j =
∑
k∈K Qk = Q, and let u, r, andw be the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints
(7.16), (7.17) and (7.18), respectively. Then, the optimal solution (x,u, r,w) of [3D-LP(x)] is
consistent with the equilibrium conditions (7.10)–(7.14).
We see that the equivalent optimization problem [3D-LP(x)] of the generalized DTCE prob-
lem has almost the same form as the three–dimensional transportation problem [3D-OTP]. There-
fore, if the commuting disutility has the Monge property, the equilibrium sorting property would
be established by the theory of optimal transport described in Section 7.1. In the next subsection,
we present an example of such disutility functions.
7.3. Analytical solution and sorting pattern
For simplicity of exposition, we assume in the following that all users have a common pre-
ferred CBD arrival time, σ = 0, and “late arrival” is prohibited (e.g., Takayama and Kuwahara,
2020). We then consider the following commuting disutility function:
Assumption 7.1. The commuting disutility for a type ( j, k) user arriving at the destination at
time s is given by
c j,k(s) = c
(1)
j,k + c
(2)
k (s) + c
(3)
j,k (s) (7.19a)
where c(1)j,k ≡ αkl j, c(2)k (s) ≡ βk f (s), c(3)j,k (s) ≡ γkg(s − l j) (7.19b)
where f (s) is a continuous function of “schedule delay” s (= s − σ) satisfying f (s) ≥ 0 for s ≤ 0f (s)→∞ for s > 0 , , f ′(s) < 0 ∀s ≤ 0.
The function g(t) denotes the “early bird cost”13 for a user departing from his/her home at time
t(s, l j) ≡ s − l j ≤ −lJ, which is a continuous function with the following properties:
g(t(s, l j)) > 0, g′(t(s, l j)) < 0, g′′(t(s, l j)) < 0 ∀t ≤ −lJ
13This type of disutility can be interpreted as the utility that the user obtains from being at home and has been consid-
ered for expressing the heterogeneity in the residential location in the city (Fosgerau and de Palma, 2012) and in the trip
length within the urban network (Fosgerau, 2015).
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where the coefficients αk, βk, and γk are values of travel time, schedule delay and activity at
home, respectively; they are arranged in an increasing order: α1 < · · · < αK, β1 < · · · <
βK, γ1 < · · · < γK.
The present model can be viewed as a DTCE model with two types of cost heterogeneity: the
values of travel time, schedule delay, and activity at home depend on the job k14, and the early
bird cost depends on the residential location j. The main difference between the conventional
and present models is related to whether the heterogeneity is given exogenously or not. Specif-
ically, in a conventional model (with heterogeneous preferred departure times and VOTs) such
as Newell (1987) and Lindsey (2004), a joint distribution of cost heterogeneities is given exoge-
nously. In the present model, the marginal distributions of cost heterogeneities, {R j} and {Qk}, are
given exogenously; however, the joint distribution {X j,k} is determined as a result of job location
choice.
Lemma 7.1. Suppose that Assumption 7.1 holds. Then the function c j,k(s) defined by (7.19)
satisfies the strict 3D-Monge property.
Proof. See Appendix D.3.
As in Lemma 6.2, combining the fact that [3D-LP(x)] is a total commuting disutility mini-
mization problem with the functional form of c j,k(s) leads to the following property of an equi-
librium departure time window.
Lemma 7.2. Under Assumption 7.1, the optimal solution x∗ of [3D-LP(x)] satisfies
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K x∗j,k(s) = µ if s ∈ Sˆ ⊂ S∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K x∗j,k(s) = 0 otherwise
(7.20)
where Sˆ ≡ [−T, 0] of length T = Q/µ.
Then, the problem [3D-LP(x)] is reduced to a three-dimensional optimal transport problem with
a strict 3D-Monge property. That is
min
F∈F
∫
[1,J]×[1,K]×Sˆ
c(ζ, κ, s)dF(ζ, κ, s) (7.21)
where F ≡
{
F(ζ,K, 0) =
∑
j′≤ξR j′ , F(J, κ, 0) =
∑
k′≤κQk′ ,
F(J,K, s) = µ · (T + s), ∀ξ ∈ [1, J], ∀κ ∈ [1,K], ∀s ∈ Sˆ
}
. (7.22)
where c(ζ, κ, s) is a continuous and submodular function that satisfies c( j, k, s) = c j,k(s), ∀ j =
1, . . . , J, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K, ∀s ∈ Sˆ.
Based on the theory of optimal transport in Section 7.1 (i.e., Theorem 7.1), we have the
following proposition.
14This is consistent with the assumption in Takayama and Kuwahara (2017) of a positive correlation between the VOT
of users and their wage.
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Figure 10: Optimal path in the three–dimensional index space
Proposition 7.2. Suppose that the commuting disutility, c j,k(s), satisfies Assumption 7.1. Then,
the solution of the DTCE problem (7.21) (or [3D-LP(x)]) is unique and given by the Fre´chet–
Hoeffding distribution.
F∗(ζ, κ, s) = min

∑
j′≤ζ
R j′ ,
∑
k′≤κ
Qk′ , µ · (T + s)
 . (7.23)
To interpret the analytical solution, let us introduce a new index i ∈ I and a joint distribution
{Xi} of {R j} and {Qk}, which are determined by the northwest corner rule:
0. Initialize the indices with i := 1, j := 1, and k := 1.
1. Set Xi = min
{
R j,Qk
}
.
2. Reduce both R j and Qk by Xi, i.e., R j := R j − Xi and Qk := Qk − Xi. If any of R j and Qk
become zero, then these indices are increased by one.
3. If
∑
i′≤i Xi′ = Q then I = i and stop; otherwise i := i + 1 and go back to Step 2.
This procedure corresponds to solving the minimization problem of the first two terms of the an-
alytical solution (7.23). By using the unique joint distribution, the analytical solution is reduced
to the following form.
F∗(ζ, κ, s) = min
∑
i′≤i
Xi′ , µ · (T + s)
 (7.24)
The joint distribution {Xi} represents the demand distribution of the departure time choice prob-
lem. As in the previous sections, let us define the time si so that the cumulative capacity supply
µ · (T + s) is equal to the cumulative demand ∑i′≤i Xi′ as follows:
si ≡
∑
i′≤i
Xi′/µ − T (7.25)
Then, the regularities of the equilibrium flow pattern can be summarized as follows.
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Proposition 7.3. The equilibrium flow pattern x∗ has the “sorting” property such that all users in
group i depart from the bottleneck in a time interval [si−1, si] of lengthXi/µ (i.e., si = si−1+Xi/µ),
and
s0 ≡ −T < s1 < s2 < · · · < sI−1 < sI = 0 (7.26)
From the determination process of the joint distribution, we see that job and location groups
are sorted in the increasing order of their indices. Hence, the proposition means that users who
live in locations closer to the CBD and have jobs with higher VOTs depart from the bottleneck
at times closer to the desired time. Figure 10 shows an example of the optimal index path of
the problem with J = 2,K = 4, and µ = 1. We see that users depart from the bottleneck in the
following order along time s: ( j, k) = (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4).
Some final remarks about the analytical solution are presented in order. First, the interpre-
tation of the analytical solution provides a clear relationship between short-run and long-run
choice problems. It is easily seen that the determination of the joint distribution {Xi} corresponds
to the long-run job-location choice problem. Given this demand distribution, the problem (7.24)
determines the short-run departure time choice problem. Second, the solution can be understood
from the combination of the two 2D-Monge properties: one is with respect to j and k, and the
other is with respect to i and s (see Appendix F for details).
8. Concluding remarks
This paper presented a systematic approach for analyzing the departure-time choice equilib-
rium (DTCE) problem of a single bottleneck with heterogeneous commuters. The approach is
based on the fact that the DTCE is equivalently represented as an LP problem with a special
structure, which can be analytically solved by exploiting the theory of optimal transport com-
bined with a hierarchical decomposition. Through applying the proposed approach to several
types of model with heterogeneous commuters, it is revealed that (i) the essential condition for
emerging equilibrium “sorting patterns,” which have been known in the literature, is that the
schedule delay functions have the “Monge property,” (ii) equilibrium problems with the Monge
property can be solved analytically (or reduced to a very simple system of equations), and (iii)
the proposed approach can be applied to a more general problem with more than two types of
heterogeneities.
A straightforward extension of this approach would be to analyze models of simultaneous
departure time and route choice in a single bottleneck per route network (e.g., a single O-D
network with multiple parallel routes) (e.g., Kuwahara and Newell, 1987; Arnott et al., 1992;
Iryo et al., 2005; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007; Liu et al., 2015). As the equilibrium condition can
be equivalently represented as a structured LP problem, the approach proposed herein could be
applied without significant modification.
Another interesting direction would be to extend the proposed approach to analyze the DTCE
problem in a corridor network with multiple bottlenecks (for a specific instance of the corridor
problem, see Akamatsu et al., 2015). Although a straightforward formulation of the problem in
a corridor network does not reduce to an LP problem, but instead to an LCP, the recent study by
Fu et al. (2018) reveals that the solution of the DTCE assignment with homogeneous commuters
can be analytically constructed from that of the DSO assignment formulated as a structured LP
problem. Therefore, it is expected that the solution of the DTCE problem with heterogeneous
commuters would also be obtained from an LP problem, which can be analyzed by extending the
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approach presented herein. The partial (positive) answer to this conjecture is provided in Osawa
et al. (2018), and a full treatment is planned for future work.
Appendix A. Point queue model
According to Kuwahara and Akamatsu (1993, 1997), the point queue model can be rep-
resented by the following three conditions. First, the state equation for the number of users
queuing at bottleneck E(t) is:
E(t) = A(t) −D(t) (A.1a)
dE(t)/dt = λ(t) − κ(t) (A.1b)
where A(t) [D(t)] denotes the cumulative arrival [departure] flow at the bottleneck by time, t,
and their derivatives with respect to time, t, are λ(t) = dA(t)/dt and κ(t) ≡ dD(t)/dt.
The second condition is the exit flow model. That is, the departure flow rate, κ(t), from the
bottleneck at time t is
κ(t) =
µ if E(t) > 0min .[λ(t), µ] if E(t) = 0 . (A.2)
The final condition concerns the relationship between the state variables and the queuing
delay. In the point queue model, the queuing delay d(t) for a user arriving at the bottleneck at
time, t, is the horizontal distance between the cumulative arrival curve A(t) and the cumulative
departure curve D(t). That is,
d(t) = E(t)/µ (A.3)
By combining these conditions, (A.1)–(A.3), we can obtain condition (3.2a).
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 4.1
We prove ∆τ(s) = 1−∆b(s) > 0 (i.e., the non-negative and the finiteness of arrival flow rate)
if ∆ck(s) > −1. Consider first a time window Sk ⊂ S when there is at least one group, say k,
that has a positive departure flow rate, i.e., xk(s) > 0. Then, the users’ optimal choice condition
(4.1b) can be written as
ck(s) + b(s) − vk = 0 ∀s ∈ Sk.
This implies that
∆b(s) = −∆ck(s) ∀s ∈ Sk.
Thus, ∆ck(s) > −1 asserts that ∆b(s) < 1.
For the remaining time window (i.e., x(s) = 0), b(s) = 0 holds because of the queuing
condition (4.2b), which implies ∆b(s) = 0. 
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Appendix C. Strong duality and complementarity slackness for the problem [2D-LP(x)]
Appendix C.1. Strong duality
We first prove the strong duality of [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u,v)], both of which have
infinite-dimensional decision variables. We first observe the weak duality.
Theorem B.1. Let x and (u,v) be arbitrary feasible solutions of [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u,v)],
respectively. Then, we have Z(x) ≥ Zˇ(u,v).
Proof. We have
Z(x) − Zˇ(u,v) =
∑
k∈K
∫
S
ck(s)xk(s)ds + µ
∫
S
u(s)ds −
∑
k∈K
Qkvk
=
∑
k∈K
∫
S
ck(s)xk(s)ds + µ
∫
S
u(s)ds −
∑
k∈K
vk
∫
S
xk(s)ds
=
∫
S
∑
k∈K
xk(s) (ck(s) + u(s) − vk) + u(s)
µ −∑
k∈K
xk(s)

 ds (C.1)
≥ 0
where the inequality is due to (4.7), (4.8), and (4.10). We thus have Z(x) ≥ Zˇ(u,v). 
Next, we divide the interval S into several pieces. Let N be an arbitrary positive integer, and
let the sub-interval be defined by
Sn ≡ [s + (n − 1)∆S, s + n∆S) n = 1, 2, . . . ,N
with ∆S ≡ (s − s)/N. Moreover, let ck and ck be piecewise constant (step/staircase) functions
defined as
ck ≡

cmaxk,1 (s ∈ S1)
...
cmaxk,N (s ∈ SN)
, ck ≡

cmink,1 (s ∈ S1)
...
cmink,N (s ∈ SN)
with
cmaxk,n ≡ sup{ck(s) | s ∈ Sn}, cmink,n ≡ inf{ck(s) | s ∈ Sn}.
Then, both functions belong to the following function set
PCN ≡
{
function f : S → R
∣∣∣ f (s) is constant over Sn for n = 1, . . . ,N}
Now, consider the following problems:
• [2D-LP(x)-u]: a problem analogous to [2D-LP(x)] with ck(s) replaced by ck and the con-
straint xk(s) ∈ PCN is added.
• [2D-LP(x)-l]: a problem analogous to [2D-LP(x)] with ck(s) replaced by ck and the con-
straint xk(s) ∈ PCN is added.
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• [2D-LP(u,v)-u]: a problem analogous to [2D-LP(u,v)] with ck(s) replaced by ck and the
constraint u(s) ∈ PCN is added.
• [2D-LP(u,v)-l]: a problem analogous to [2D-LP(u,v)] with ck(s) replaced by ck and the
constraint u(s) ∈ PCN is added.
Note that these four problems can be regarded as LP problems with finite-dimensional deci-
sion variables because xk(s) and u(s) are piecewise constant functions. Therefore, the strong
duality must hold between [2D-LP(x)-u] and [2D-LP(u,v)-u], and between [2D-LP(x)-l] and
[2D-LP(u,v)-l].
Now, let val[ · ] and F [ · ] be the optimal value and feasible set of problems [ · ]. Then, we
have the following lemma.
Lemma B.1. For any N > 0, we have
0 ≤ val[2D-LP(x)] − val[2D-LP(u,v)] ≤ val[2D-LP(x)-u] − val[2D-LP(u,v)-l]
= val[2D-LP(x)-u] − val[2D-LP(x)-l]
Proof. The first inequality is due to the weak duality, and the equality follows as val[2D-
LP(u,v)-l] and val[2D-LP(x)-l] are the primal-dual pair of finite-dimensional LP problems.
Thus, we only show the second inequality.
We first show val[2D-LP(x)] ≤ val[2D-LP(x)-u]. Let Z(x) be the objective function of
[2D-LP(x)-u]. Then, from ck(s) ≤ ck(s), we have Z(x) ≤ Z(x) for any x ≥ 0. Moreover, we
have F [2D-LP(x)-u] ⊆ F [2D-LP(x)] because [2D-LP(x)-u] has additional constraints xk(s) ∈
PCN(k ∈ K ). Thus, we have val[2D-LP(x)] ≤ val[2D-LP(x)-u].
Next, we show val[2D-LP(u,v)] ≥ val[2D-LP(u,v)-l]. Notice that Zˇ(u,v) serves as the ob-
jective function of [2D-LP(u,v)-l] as well as [2D-LP(u,v)]. Moreover, we haveF [2D-LP(u,v)-l]
⊆ F [2D-LP(u,v)] since F [2D-LP(u,v)-l] has additional constraints xk(s) ∈ PCN(k ∈ K ) and
it follows ck(s) + u(s) − vk ≥ 0 ⇒ ck(s) + u(s) − vk ≥ 0. Hence we have val[2D-LP(u,v)] ≥
val[2D-LP(u,v)-l]. This completes the proof. 
Using this lemma, we can show the strong duality of [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u,v)].
Theorem B.2. Suppose that ck(s) is continuous over S. Then we have val[2D-LP(x)]= val[2D-
LP(u,v)].
Proof. First, we fix N > 0 arbitrarily. Let xN and xN be the optima of [2D-LP(x)-u] and [2D-
LP(x)-l], respectively. Noting xNk (s), xNk (s) ∈ PCN, we denote the n-th constant of xNk (s) and
xNk (s) by x
N
k,n and xNk,n, respectively, for each k ∈ K . Moreover, let δN ≥ 0 be defined by
δN ≡ max
{
ck(s) − ck(s)
∣∣∣ k ∈ K , s ∈ S}
= max
{
cmaxk,n − cmink,n
∣∣∣ k ∈ K , n ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N}} .
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Then, we have
val[2D-LP(x)-u] − val[2D-LP(x)-l]
=
∑
k∈K
∫
S
ck(s)x
N
k (s)ds −
∑
k∈K
∫
S
ck(s)x
N
k (s)ds
≤
∑
k∈K
∫
S
ck(s)xNk (s)ds −
∑
k∈K
∫
S
ck(s)x
N
k (s)ds
≤
∑
k∈K
∫
S
δNxNk (s)ds
= δN
∑
k∈K
Qk (C.2)
where the first inequality follows because xN is the optimum of [2D-LP(x)-u] and xN belongs to
F [2D-LP(x)-u]. Because ck(s) is continuous, we have limN→∞ δN = 0. This together with (C.2)
and Lemma B.1 yields val[2D-LP(x)]= val[2D-LP(u,v)]. This completes the proof. 
In the above theorem, we assumed that ck(s) is continuous over S. However, even when ck(s)
is discontinuous at a finite number of points on S, we can obtain the same result.
Corollary B.1. Suppose that there exists sˆm (m = 1, 2, . . . ,M) such that ck(s) is continuous over
S \ {sˆ1, . . . , sˆM}. Then we have val[2D-LP(x)]= val[2D-LP(u,v)].
Proof. Considering the finitely many sub-intervals [s, sˆ1), [sˆ1, sˆ2), . . . , [sˆM, s], we can prove the
corollary in a similar manner.
Appendix C.2. Equivalence of complementarity slackness conditions
Note that (C.1) implies that
Z(x) − Zˇ(u,v) =
∫
S
∑
k∈K
xk(s) (ck(s) + u(s) − vk) + u(s)
µ −∑
k∈K
xk(s)

 ds.
Hence, if x and (u,v) satisfy (4.11)–(4.12), then we have Z(x)− Zˇ(u,v) = 0; that is, x and (u,v)
are optima of [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u,v)], respectively.
On the contrary, if x and (u,v) optimize [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u,v)], respectively, then we
have Z(x) − Zˇ(u,v) = 0; that is, (4.11)–(4.12) are satisfied15.
Appendix D. Proofs of the Monge property
Appendix D.1. Proof of Lemma 5.1
We show that the function c : K × S → R defined by (5.9) is a strict submodular:
ck(s) + ck+1(s′) < ck+1(s) + ck(s′) for all s < s′, 1 ≤ k < K. (D.1)
15In this case, the equalities in (4.11) and (4.12) hold almost everywhere over S.
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Condition (D.1) can be rewritten using f () as follows.
f ((σk+1, s) + δs) − f ((σk+1, s))
δs
<
f ((σk, s) + δs) − f ((σk, s))
δs
(D.2)
where δs ≡ s′−s > 0. The strict convexity of the function f implies that the slope monotonically
increases with the increase in . Combining this property with (σk+1, s) < (σk, s) (∵ σk <
σk+1), we conclude that Eq.(D.2) and thus Eq.(D.1) hold true. 
Appendix D.2. Proof of Lemma 6.1
We show that the function c : K ×S → R defined by (6.1) is a strict supermodular for s ≤ 0:
ck(s) + ck+1(s′) > ck+1(s) + ck(s′) for all s < s′ ≤ 0, 1 ≤ k < K. (D.3)
The condition (D.3) can be rewritten as follows:
(βk − βk+1) · ( f e(s) − f e(s′)) > 0 (D.4)
This holds true because βk − βk+1 > 0 and f e(·) is a decreasing function of s (or ). 
Appendix D.3. Proof of Lemma 7.1
We prove that the function c: J×K×S → R defined by (7.19) satisfies the three-dimensional
Monge property. To do so, we show that the function c is submodular with respect to any two of
its arguments:
c j,k(s) + c j,k+1(s′) < c j,k+1(s) + c j,k(s′) for all s ≤ s′ ≤ 0, 1 ≤ k < K, ∀ j ∈ J (D.5a)
c j,k(s) + c j+1,k(s′) < c j+1,k(s) + c j,k(s′) for all s ≤ s′ ≤ 0, 1 ≤ j < J, ∀k ∈ K (D.5b)
c j,k(s) + c j+1,k+1(s) < c j+1,k(s) + c j,k+1(s) for all 1 ≤ j < J, 1 ≤ k < K, ∀s ≤ 0 (D.5c)
By a straightforward manipulation, we have the following equivalent conditions:
(βk − βk+1)
f (s′) − f (s)
δs
+ (γk − γk+1)
g(s′ − l j) − g(s − l j)
δs
> 0 (D.6a)
− 1
δl
(
g(s′ − l j+1) − g(s − l j+1)
δs
− g(s
′ − l j) − g(s − l j)
δs
)
> 0 (D.6b)
− (αk − αk+1) + (γk − γk+1)
g(s − l j+1) − g(s − l j)
δl
> 0 (D.6c)
where δs ≡ s′ − s > 0, and δl ≡ l j − l j+1 > 0. The first line holds true because βk − βk+1 <
0, γk − γk+1 < 0 and f ′(s), g′(t) < 0; the second line holds true because g′′(t) < 0; and the third
line holds true because αk − αk+1 < 0. 
Appendix E. Other proofs in Section 6
Appendix E.1. Proof of Proposition 6.2
By solving the following recursive equation:
v∗k := v
∗
k+1 − ck+1(−sk) + ck(−sk) = v∗k+1 + βˆk f e(−sk) ∀k = 1, . . . ,K − 1. (E.1)
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with the boundary condition v∗K = cK(−T) = βˆK f e(−sK), it is evident that the analytical solution
(6.8) is obtained. By substituting v∗ into a user’s optimal choice condition, we have
u∗(s) = v∗k − βk f e(s) ∀s ∈ [−sk,−sk−1], ∀k ∈ K (E.2)
Combining the queuing condition (4.2b) with Lemma 6.2 yields∑
k∈K
x∗k(s) = 0 < µ ⇒ u∗(s) = 0 ∀s ∈ S \ Sˆ. (E.3)
Thus, we conclude that Eq.(6.9) holds. 
Appendix E.2. Proof of Lemma 6.4
Suppose that the objective function of the upper-level problem is convex. Then the optimality
condition of the upper-level problem (6.24) is given as the following variational inequality (VI)
problem.
Find s∗ ∈ Ω ≡ {Eqs.(6.25) and (6.26)} such that∑
h∈H
∇ZM(sh∗) · (sh − sh∗) ≥ 0 s∗ ∈ Ω. (E.4)
where the element of the gradient of the objective function ∇ZM(sh∗) is given by
∂ZM(sh)
∂shk
=
µβˆk f e(−sek) if h = eµγˆk f l(slk) if h = l (E.5)
We then show the strict monotonicity of ∇ZM(sh∗). For any two non-negative vectors sh and s˜h
(sh , s˜h), we have
(∇ZM(se) − ∇ZM(s˜e)) · (se − s˜e) = µ
∑
k∈K
βˆk{ f e(−sek) − f e(−s˜ek)}(sek − s˜ek) > 0 (E.6a)
(∇ZM(sl) − ∇ZM(s˜l)) · (sl − s˜l) = µ
∑
k∈K
γˆk{ f l(slk) − f l(s˜lk)}(slk − s˜lk) > 0 (E.6b)
The last inequalities of both equations follow from the fact that f e(s) is a decreasing function of s
and f l(s) is an increasing function of s. Thus, we conclude that the upper-level problem (6.24) is
actually a convex programming problem and the optimal solution of it (or the VI problem (E.4))
is unique. 
Appendix E.3. Proof of Proposition 6.5
Because properties 1 and 2 of Proposition 6.5 are trivial, we show the proof of the property 3
only. If the strict inequality holds in constraint (6.25) or condition (6.27) (i.e., an optimal solution
of the problem (6.24) is in the interior of the feasible region), the equilibrium costs of early and
late arrival users in group k must be identical (i.e., ve∗k = v
l∗
k ):∑
k′≥k
{
βˆk′ f e(−sek′ )
}
=
∑
k′≥k
{
γˆk′ f l(slk′ )
}
∀k ∈ K (E.7)
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which implies
βˆk f e(−se∗k ) = γˆk f l(sl∗k ) ∀k ∈ K (E.8)
We thus have Eq.(6.28). 
An example is that an interior optimal solution is always feasible and thus exists. Assume
that γk/βk = η (constant) for all k ∈ K and that Eq.(E.8) is satisfied for all k ∈ K , that is,µ(sek + slk) =
∑
k′≤kQk′
f e(−sek) = η f l(slk)
∀k ∈ K (E.9)
From these equations, we first see that sek and s
l
k are positive for
∑
k′≤kQk′ > 0. This is because
both f e(−s) and f l(s) are zero at s = 0 and are strictly increasing functions of s > 0. We then
consider the consecutive groups k and k+1 and assume that sek ≥ sek+1. From the second condition
of Eq.(E.9), we obtain:
f l(slk) ≥ f l(slk+1) ⇔ slk ≥ slk+1. (E.10)
We thus conclude that
sek + s
l
k ≥ sek+1 + slk+1. (E.11)
However, this condition contradicts the first condition of Eq.(E.9) (i.e., flow conservation), i.e.,
sek < s
e
k+1 must hold. By the same logic, we can obtain s
l
k < s
l
k+1. Hence we finally obtain
0 < sh1 < s
h
2 < · · · < shK−1 < shK ∀h ∈ H (E.12)
which shows the existence of an interior optimal solution.
Appendix E.4. Proof of the strict monotonicity of vh∗(Xh)
We show that the strict monotonicity of vh∗(Xh) for the case of h = e (we omit the proof for
the case of h = l because almost the same discussion holds). From the analytical solution (6.8)
and the definition of sk, the equilibrium trip cost can be expressed as an explicit function of ye:
v∗ek (X
e) =
∑
k′≥k
βˆk′ · f e(−∑m≤k′ Xem/µ) ∀k ∈ K (E.13)
or its vector-matrix form of
v∗(Xe) = LTc(−se(Xe)) (E.14)
where L (LT) is the lower (upper) triangle matrix, c(−se(Xe)) ≡ [βˆ1 · f e(−se1), . . . , βˆK · f e(−seK)]T
and se(Xe) ≡ [Xe1/µ, . . . ,
∑
k′≤K Xek′/µ]
T = (1/µ)LXe. We thus have, for any two non-negative
vectors Xe and X˜e,
(v∗(Xe) − v∗(X˜e)) · (Xe − X˜e) = {LT(c(−se(Xe)) − c(−se(X˜e)))}T(Xe − X˜e)
= (c(−se(Xe)) − c(−se(X˜e))TL(Xe − X˜e)
= µ
∑
k∈K
βˆk{ f e(−sek) − f e(−s˜ek)}(sek − s˜ek) > 0
38
The last inequality follows from the fact that f e(s) is a decreasing function of s. Thus, we
conclude that the VI problem (6.29) is a monotone problem. Furthermore, if the function f e(·) is
continuously differentiable, we have
∂v∗k(X
e)
∂Xek′
=
(−1/µ)
∑
k′≥k βˆk′ · f ′e(−sek′ ) if k = k′
(−1/µ) ∑m≥max{k,k′} βˆm · f ′e(−sem) if k , k′ . (E.15)
This shows that ∇v∗(Xe) is symmetric and v∗(Xe) is integrable.
Appendix F. Hierarchical decomposition of [3D-LP(x)]
To see the combination of the two Monge properties definitively, we define a new variable
X j,k as follows:
X j,k ≡
∫
Sˆ
x j,k(s)ds. (F.1)
Substituting the commuting disutility function (7.19) into the objective function of [3D-LP(x)],
we can then see that Z(x) can be decomposed into the following two terms:
Z(x) = ZM(X) + ZS(x) (F.2)
where
ZM(X) ≡
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
c(1)j,kX j,k (F.3)
ZS(x) ≡
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
∫
Sˆ
(
c(2)k (s) + c
(3)
j,k (s)
)
x j,k(s)ds (F.4)
This implies that [3D-LP(x)] allows the following decomposition:
min
X≥0 . ZM(X) + Z
∗
S(X) (F.5)
subject to
∑
k∈K
X j,k = R j ∀ j ∈ J (F.6)∑
j∈J
X j,k = Qk ∀k ∈ K (F.7)
where Z∗S(X) ≡ minx≥0 . ZS(x | X) (F.8)
subject to
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
x j,k(s) = µ ∀s ∈ Sˆ (F.9)∫
Sˆ
x j,k(s)ds = X j,k ∀ j ∈ J , ∀k ∈ K (F.10)
The lower-level problem (or subproblem) determines the short-run DTCE for a given joint dis-
tribution of {R j} and {Qk}. The upper-level (or master) problem determines the long-run job-
location choice equilibrium based on the cost including the short-run effect Z∗S(X). While the
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upper-level and sub-problems should be solved iteratively in general, the analytical solution im-
plies that these problems can be solved sequentially. Specifically, the upper-level problem can
be solved by the northwest corner rule (i.e., the objective function (F.5) satisfies the 2D-Monge
property with respect to j and k), and the lower-level problem can also be solved in a similar
manner for a given optimal solution {X j,k} or equivalently {Xi} (i.e., the objective function (F.8)
satisfies the 2D-Monge property with respect to s and i).
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